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PRIVACY, ABORTION, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW:
HAUNTED BY THE GHOST OF LOCHNER
Helen Garfield*
[M]ore than any other constitutional decision of recent times, the Abortiouf
Cases.

.

.rekindled the debate about the legitimacy of.

.

.noninterpretive

[udicial] review.'
The latest phase of the debate on the legitimacy and scope of judicial
review opened with a stunning critique of Roe v. Wade2 by Professor (now
Dean) Ely.3 Ely blasted Roe as an illegitimate resurrection of the substantive due process doctrine of Lochner v. New York. 4 Indeed, he characterized Roe as even more dangerous than Lochner5 and credited it with
*Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. B.S.J., 1945, Northwestern
University; J.D., 1967, University of Colorado.
This article is the outgrowth of a larger work in progress, focusing on Justice Brandeis' contributions
to the law, particularly the law of privacy. Portions of this article will be incorporated into the larger
work. This project was initiated in a 1980 summer seminar in legal history sponsored by the National
Endowment for the Humanities and directed by Professor Robert M. Cover of the Yale Law School. It
was continued under an Open Faculty Fellowship granted in 1981 by Lilly Endowment, Inc., of
Indianapolis, and during the author's sabbatical leave from Indiana University School of LawIndianapolis in the fall
of 1982. These and other grants for travel and expenses from the law school and
the Indiana University Foundation were invaluable aids in the development of this project and the
research that led to this article.
I acknowledge with gratitude the permission granted me by the Harvard Law School and Professor
Paul A. Freund to use and quote from the Louis D. Brandeis Collection in the Harvard Law School
Library, Manuscript Division, and the invaluable assistance provided by Mrs. Erika Chadbourne,
Curator of the Manuscript Division. I also appreciate the helpful suggestions of my colleagues, Bill
Hodes, David Papke, Ken Stroud, and Jim Torke, who read and commented upon earlier drafts of this
article. And I must acknowledge the role played in the development of the ideas presented here by the
many stimulating and challenging discussions I have had with students in my constitutional law classes
and seminars.
Copyright © 1986 by Helen Garfield:
1. M. PARRY, THE CONSTITTIMON, THE CouRTrs, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 144 (1982); see also Gerety,
Doing WithoutPrivacy, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 143,143 (1981) ("Had it ended with Griswoldv. Connecticut,
in 1965, the right to privacy might have gone largely without criticism.").
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). The
current debate is but a continuation of a debate that has been going on since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In the recent past, its participants have included Learned Hand, Herbert
Wechsler, Charles Black, Alexander Bickel, and many more. See generally G. GUNTHER, CoNsTrruTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 22-25 (10th ed. 1980).
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. Ely, supra note 3, at 940, 943. Justice Rehnquist's dissent inRoe also accuses the Court majority
of resurrecting Lochner, Roe, 410 U.S. at 174, and Justice White's dissent calls the majority opinion
"an exercise of raw judicial power," id. at 222.
There are other parallels between Ely's criticism and Rehnquist's dissent. Neither Ely nor Rehnquist
sees any relationship between abortion and privacy. Ely, supra note 3, at 932 ("All of this . . . has
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precipitating a reexamination of his own position in the ongoing controversy over the relative merits of "interpretive" and "noninterpretive"
modes of judicial review. 6 The result of this soul-searching was a theory of

judicial review that managed to justify virtually all of the reforms of the
Warren Court except the right of privacy. 7 In Ely's terminology, interpretive review is confined to enforcement of "norms that are stated or
clearly implicit in the written Constitution"; noninterpretive review enforces "norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners" of the

Constitution.8
To the strict interpretivist, of course, the question is an easy one: neither

privacy nor abortion is mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. The
interpretivists did not need Roe to trigger their criticism of the constitutional right of privacy; it surfaced after the first privacy case, Griswold v.

Connecticut.9 But now, after Roe, even noninterpretivists and neo-interpretivists 10 are haunted by the ghost of Lochner and the spectre of Alexander Bickel's "counter-majoritarian difficulty. ""I Bickel himself attacked
Roe as judicial legislation. 12 Professor Perry characterized it as "perhaps
nothing to do with privacy in the Bill of Rights sense or any other the Constitution suggests. "); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I have difficulty in concluding ... that
the right of 'privacy' is involved in this case."). Both recognize that the right to decide whether to have
an abortion may be part of the liberty protected by substantive due process, but neither can see any
reason for giving this right special protection. Each would use the lenient rational basis standard, the
same standard that has been applied to economic legislation since the Court's repudiation ofLochner, to
test government action restricting the right.
6. Roe, Ely writes, "forced all of us who work in the area to think about which camp we fall into."
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 2-3 (1980).

7. Ely's theory, which elevates Carolene Products footnote four, United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), to the status of an axiom, is discussed infra notes 182-206, 228-45.
255-75, and accompanying text.
8. J. ELY, supra note 6, at 1. Perry similarly defines noninterpretivist judicial review as "constitutional policymaking." M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 6. Brest uses somewhat different terminology to
express a similar distinction between "originalism" and "nonoriginalism." He further subdivides
originalism into "strict textualism" or literalism, "strict intentionalism," and "moderate originalism."
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 204-05 (1980).
For consistency, this article will use Ely's definitions in discussing judicial review.
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see id. at 507 (Black, J., dissenting); R. BEROER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 249-82 (1977) (discussing

Griswold and substantive due process); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 7-11 (1971) (discussing Griswold).
10. Professor Alexander describes Ely's theory as "neo-interpretivism." Alexander, Modern
Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 9-10 (1981).
1I. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
12. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27-28 (1975) (published posthumously):
On January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court, paying formal tribute to Holmes's 1905 dissent (in
Lochner] but violating its spirit, undertook to settle the abortion issue. In place of the various state
abortion statutes in controversy and in flux, the Supreme Court prescribed a virtually uniform
statute of its own.
Id. at 27.
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the paradigmatic example of a court constitutionalizing nonconstitutional
values." 13 Perry devised a "functional" theory of judicial review that
would preserve noninterpretive review, including the right of privacy, but
would subject it to the power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of federal
courts.14 Professor (now Dean) Choper also would preserve the right of
privacy, but he has offered no substantive theory to justify it. 15
To be sure, there are those who see little substance in the debate and little

point in attempting to distinguish interpretivism from noninterpretivism,

16

but the discussion continues unabated, and the stakes are high. Much more
than a "right to abortion" is involved here. The values protected by the line
of cases culminating in Roe are individual privacy and autonomy; these
values are central to our society and increasingly threatened by modem
technology. 17 Even though the dire prophecies of George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World have not been
completely realized, we have come close enough to justify concern. ' 8 We
do not yet have Orwell's omnipresent telescreen, but techniques of surveillance are proliferating, and the collection of personal data in computer
13. Perry, SubstantiveDue ProcessRevisited:Reflections on (andBeyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw.
U.L. REv. 417, 420 (1976); see also Lupu, ConstitutionalTheory and The Searchfor the Workable
Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 579, 583 (1983) ("Roe cut fundamental rights adjudication loose from
the constitutional text.").
14. Perry would concede such power to Congress only in cases involving noninterpretive review.
M. PERRY, supra note 1. Perry's theory is discussed infra notes 198-99, 207-14, 246-55, and
accompanying text.
15. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980). Professor Choper's
proposals are discussed infra notes 215-23, 276-77, and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST'ITITIONAL LAW 566-67 (1978); Sedler, The Legitimacy
Debatein ConstitutionalAdjudication:
An Assessment and a DifferentPerspective,44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93
(1983); Tushnet, Darknesson the Edge of Town: The Contributionsof John HartEly to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980); Wellington, Book Review, 97 HARv. L. REv. 326 (1983) (reviewing J.
PERRY, THE CONSTrrtON, THE COURTS, AND HuMAN RIGHTS (1982)).
17. "All the forces of the technological age [have operated to] narrow the area of privacy .
Emerson, Nine Justicesin Searchof a Doctrine,64 MICH. L. REv. 219,229 (1965). See generally Peck,
Extending the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the New TechnologicalAge, 12 HoFSTRA L. REv. 893
(1984).
18. The loss of privacy was a key factor in these two fictional works. G. ORwELL, NINETEEN
EIGHrY-FouR (1948); A. HUXLEY, BRAvE NEW WORLD (1932). In the perpetual war of George Orwell's
Nineteen Eighty-Four,constant surveillance and mind control led to a total loss of privacy. "[T]o do
anything that suggested a taste for solitude. . . was always slightly dangerous." G. ORWELL,supra, at
81. The two-way telescreen followed every movement, and "[b]y a routine that was not even secret, all
letters were opened in transit." Id. at 112. The perpetual peace of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World,
where "everyone belong[ed] to every one else," A. HUXLEY, supra, at 26, reached the same end by a
different route. The constant pursuit of mindless pleasure reduced everyone to no more than a "cell in
the social body." Id. at 60. Not only was there a total loss of privacy, but constant conditioning had
eradicated even the desire for privacy. In the reality of 1984, we found neither perpetual war nor
perpetual peace, but rather perpetual non-war and non-peace. Government is neither as oppressive as it
was in Orwell's vision, nor as paternalistic as it was in Huxley's, but it has some disturbing elements of
both.
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memory banks is mushrooming. The threat to privacy and autonomy is real

enough to underline the need for protective measures to ensure that Orwell's vision of 1984 does not become the reality of 2004, or even 1994.
Legal and constitutional protections of privacy and autonomy have taken

diverse forms that share common threads. The tort action for invasion of
privacy, generally credited as originating with the Warren-Brandeis article,
The Right to Privacy,19 protects the individual from unwanted publicity and
other intrusions upon his or her private life. 20 The fourth amendment

protects against government intrusion into a person's home and private
papers; the fifth amendment protects against forced elicitation of selfincriminating testimony. 2 1More recently, the substantive due process right
of privacy first enunciated in Griswold22 has been applied to various forms
of government intrusion into the privacies of life, from zoning laws 23 to

marriage laws 24 to storage of information in computers. 25 But it is primarily
the constitutional protection afforded the abortion decision, 26 that has
precipitated the cry of Lochnerism and revitalized the interpretivist/noninterpretivist debate. In Roe, the right of privacy finally emerged from the
Griswold penumbras and stood revealed as what in fact it had always
been-a substantive due process concept. 27 The ghost of Lochner walked
again!28
This article poses the question whetherLochner can finally be laid to rest
without repudiating all applications of substantive due process, particu-

larly protection of privacy and autonomy. The answer to that question
19. 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). See generallyBloustein, PrivacyasanAspectofHumanDignity:
An Answer to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962 (1964).
20. Other tort actions, such as intentional infliction of emotional harm and trespass, also protect
privacy interests.
21. U.S. CoNsT. amends. IV, V. A link between the tort concept of privacy and the protections of
the fourth and fifth amendments is provided in the parallels between the Warren-Brandeis article and
Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,471 (1928). See infra notes 296-303 and
accompanying text.
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives). Although
Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court denies reliance on the due process clause, five concurring
justices do acknowledge the substantive due process underpinnings of the constitutional right of
privacy. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
23. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).
24. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (decided under the fundamental rights branch
of equal protection analysis). The fundamental right relied upon in Zablocki was the substantive due
process right of privacy.
25. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
26. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. Many recognized privacy as a substantive due process concept from the beginning. See, e.g.,
Emerson, supra note 17; Henkin, Privacy andAutonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974).
Justice Douglas' penumbra rationale, which tended to obscure the substantive due process roots of
the right of privacy, is discussed infra notes 71, 77-82, and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 937-43 (equating Roe with Lochner).
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requires a closer look at Lochner itself, and then at Griswold, Roe, and a
few of the cases in between. The answers suggested by Ely, Perry, Choper,
and others will then be discussed. Finally, this article will examine the
ideas and ideals of the man who first conceived the common law right of
privacy, Justice Louis D. Brandeis.
To attempt to look at the problem through the eyes of Brandeis is not to
suggest that Brandeis himself would have endorsed Roe v. Wade or any of
the other specific applications of the right of privacy.2 9 Indeed, it is more
likely that he would not have agreed with the abortion decisions. 30 But his
lifelong concern with the values of privacy and autonomy suggests that his
thought may well provide a useful counterpoint to current efforts to purge
all such values from constitutional adjudication, and may also provide
some much-needed guidance in the current controversy over the role of the
courts in protecting those values in our constitutional democracy.
I.

THE RISE AND FALL OF LOCHNER

Lochner v. New York 3' struck down a New York statute that limited hours
of work for bakers to ten per day or sixty per week. The Court held that the
right to make a contract to purchase or sell labor was part of the liberty
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 32 The
Lochner majority did not expressly identify liberty of contract as a "fundamental" right, nor did it purport to apply anything more than the usual
rational basis standard of review, which is not surprising since the present
double standard of review had not yet been developed. The majority simply
held the state's proffered health justification "unreasonable and entirely
arbitrary," '33 and the law itself "mere meddlesome interference with the
29. See infra notes 305-09 and accompanying text.
30. See Interview with Professor Paul A. Freund in Cambridge, Mass. (Sept. 18, 1981); Interview
with Judge Henry L Friendly in New York City (Dec. 16, 1981); see also infra note 305 and

accompanying text.
31. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
32. Id. at 53 (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the first case to announce special
constitutional protection for liberty of contract).
33. Id. at 62. The state's claim that the statute was valid as a labor law was dismissed in a few words:
"There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by
determining the hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker." Id. at 57. In rejecting the state's attempt to
justify the statute as a health measure, the Court found that the trade of baker was "not an unhealthy one
to that degree which would authorize the legislature to interfere with the right to labor, and with the right
of free contract on the part of the individual, either as employer oremployee." Id. at 59. The first Justice
Harlan, joined in dissent by Justices White and Day, cited treatises, reports, and statistics supporting
the state's health claims and concluded that it was "not the province of the Court to inquire" as to the
wisdom of the legislation. Id. at 69. Justice Holmes dissented separately. His often-quoted dissent
admonishes that the fourteenth amendment "does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Id.

at 75.
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rights of the individual,"

34

language that today would be appropriate in a

case applying the lowest level of scrutiny. What gave the test its bite was the

35
Lochner Court's extremely narrow view of legitimate public purpose.
The net effect was the same as though the Court had held, in today's

parlance, that liberty of contract was a fundamental right, to be restricted
only in furtherance of the most compelling state interests. In effect, the
Court applied strict scrutiny, a fact noted by Justice Holmes, whose dissent
36
objected to the special protected status thus accorded liberty of contract.
The effort to identify rights that were truly fundamental enough to
deserve special protection began with the Holmes and Brandeis dissents in
the early free speech cases. 37 By 1925, in Gitlow v. New York, 38 the Court
was willing to "assume that freedom of speech and of the press-which are

protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress-are
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States. '39 The Holmes dissent, joined by Justice Brandeis, advocated a
higher level of scrutiny, expressed in the "clear and present danger" test,

for state statutes abridging free speech. 40 Translated into today's language,
34. Id. at 61.
35. See L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 8-4, at 438 (noting that the "strict judicial assessment of
legislative ends" was "striking" in the Lochner line of cases).
36. Justice Holmes' dissent argued that a state statute should not be struck down as unconstitutional
"unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed
would infringefundamental principlesas they have been understood by the traditions of our people and
our law." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added). Note that the Holmes dissent did not repudiate
substantive due process. Rather, it conceded that there were some fundamental principles that might
justify the Court in overriding legislative judgments, but maintained that liberty of contract was not
among them.
Justice Holmes' early opposition to treating liberty of contract as a fundamental right was carried on
in the twenties and thirties by Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo.
37. E.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the result)
(joined by Holmes, J.); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(joined by Brandeis, J.). Characterization of this effort as a quest for fundamental rights was clearly a
response to the Court's identification of liberty of contract as such a right in Lochner. See infra note 43
and accompanying text.
38. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
39. Id. at 666. Despite this stated assumption, the majority was willing to give the New York statute
involved in Gitlow "every presumption . . . in favor of [its] validity." Id. at 668. In modem
constitutional analysis, the strong presumption of constitutionality employed in Gitlow would be
consistent with the lowest level of scrutiny, rather than the highest level usually employed in cases
involving legislation restricting the fundamental right of freedom of speech. Abridgement of a
fundamental right usually triggers a presumption of unconstitutionality.
40. Id. at 672-73. The clear and present danger test was first enunciated in Holmes' opinion for the
Court in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Holmes was willing to concede, in Gitlow, that
perhaps the states should be allowed a "somewhat larger latitude of interpretation" of free speech under
the fourteenth amendment than Congress was allowed under the first amendment. 268 U.S. at 672.
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the test required a compelling state interest (clear and present danger) to
41
justify abridgement of the fundamental right of freedom of speech.
The modem fundamental rights/compelling state interest analysis was
even more clearly foreshadowed in Brandeis' concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California:
The right of free speech, the right to teach and the right of assembly are, of
course,fundamentalrights. .

.

.These may not be denied or abridged. But,

although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not
in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the state from
destructionorfrom serious injury, political, economic or moral. . . .[T]he

necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless speech
would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of
some substantive evil which the state constitutionally may seek to prevent
42

Here the elements of today's strict scrutiny analysis are explicitly set out: a
statute abridging first amendment rights is justified only if necessary
("required") in order to further a compelling interest (here, preservation of
the state from "clear and imminent danger" of "destruction or . . .
serious injury"). The constitutional balance Brandeis advocated, heavily
weighted in favor of first amendment rights, was his response to the
Lochner line of cases.
Although he opposed special due process protection for liberty of
contract, Brandeis was willing to use substantive due process to protect
personal rights he deemed fundamental, including "Right to appeal, Right
to education, Right to choice of profession, Right to locomotion," as well
as freedom of speech. 43 Brandeis' "Right to education" and "Right to
41. The clear and present danger test has been widely criticized both for being too lenient and for
being too strict. See generallyG. GuNTHER,supra note 3. Some of that criticism is based on subsequent
modifications of the test in, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See Torke, Some Notes
on the ProperUses of the Clearand Present DangerTest, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 32-33.
42. 274 U.S. 357,373 (1927) (emphasis added). Brandeis' concurrence was originally written as a
dissent in another case, Ruthenberg v. Michigan, 273 U.S. 782 (1927), which was mooted by the death
of the defendant. The language of the Ruthenberg dissent was then incorporated into the Whitney
concurrence. See Cover, The Left, the Right andthe FirstAmendment: 1918-1928, 40 MD. L. REv. 349,
384 (1981) (discussing the evolution of substantive due process protection of freedom of speech in the
dissents of Holmes and Brandeis in the 1920's).
43. Felix Frankfurter's notes of conversations with Brandeis, Brandeis Papers, Harvard Law
School Library, Manuscript Division [hereinafter cited as Brandeis Harvard Papers], quoted in Cover,
supra note 42, at 377 n. 102. Cover places these conversations, preserved in then-Professor Frankfurter's notes, in the summer of 1923. In the quoted conversation, Brandeis indicated a willingness to
abandon substantive due process altogether (presumably to put an end to the Lochner doctrine), but
while it existed, he felt that it "must be applied . . .to things that are fundamental." Id. This
willingness to confine the due process clause to protection of procedural rights only, Alexander Bickel

299

Washington Law Review

Vol. 61:293, 1986

choice of profession" were implicated in two substantive due process cases
decided during the 1920's, Meyer v. Nebraska44 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,45 which are the most direct precedent for the right of privacy
enunciated in Griswold.46 Despite his opposition to Lochner, Brandeis
47
voted with the majority in both Meyer and Pierce.
The retreat from Lochner began in the 1930's. 48 In 1938, the Court

formulated the present very lax rational basis standard of judicial review in
United States v. CaroleneProducts Co. 49 Even without detailed legislative
histories, in economic regulation cases "the existence of facts supporting

has described as merely a "flirtation." A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 28
(1970). The flirtation was abandoned in Whitney, when Brandeis, somewhat reluctantly, accepted a due
process rationale for protection of free speech. 274 U.S. at 373 ("Despite arguments to the contrary
which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.").
Brandeis' "Right to locomotion" clearly envisioned the fundamental right now protected as the right
to travel, or the right to move freely from state to state. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
44. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Professor Cover places the Brandeis-Frankfurter conversation, see supra
note 43, in 1923; therefore the specific reference would have been to Meyer and Bartels v. Iowa, 262
U.S. 404 (1923), decided at the same time. See Cover, supra note 42, at 378 n.102.
45. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
46. In Professor Gunther's phrase, these cases represent "an aspect of the Lochner tradition that
never wholly died." G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 571.
47. In Meyer, the Court invalidated a state law prohibiting the teaching of German in public
schools. Over Justice Holmes' dissent, 262 U.S. at 403, the Court restated its broad view of the liberty
protected by the due process clause:
Without doubt, it [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399 (emphasis added). This passage is a restatement, with added emphasis on personal rights, of
the Court's earlier definition of liberty in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897):
The "liberty" mentioned in [the fourteenth] amendment means, not only the right of the citizen to
be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to
embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; tobe free touse them
in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to
pursue any livelihood or avocation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned.
Since Allgeyer involved the right to make an insurance contract, its emphasis on what Meyer
summarizes as the right "to engage in any of the common occupations of life" is not surprising.
In Pierce, a unanimous Court held an Oregon law that required all children to attend public schools
unconstitutional under the due process clause. The Meyer right "to marry, to establish a home and bring
up children" was further amplified as the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control." Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
48. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
49. 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting interstate
shipment of "filled milk").
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the legislative judgment [was] to be presumed." 5 0 Legislation regulating
commercial transactions was not to be invalidated "unless in the light of the
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators."51
Having clothed economic legislation with so strong a presumption of
constitutionality, Justice Stone recognized that he might be diluting the
constitutional protection afforded individual rights. In the now-famous
footnote four, he conceded that " [t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality" when legislation (1) "appears
on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution," or (2)
"restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," or (3) discriminates against
minorities, since "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
52
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."
Thus the Court's dual standard of review was born.
Footnote four figures prominently in the current debate on judicial
review, especially in Ely's theory, and so merits close examination. It sets
out three categories of legislation that may need to be subjected to "more
exacting judicial scrutiny" than the loose rational basis standard enunciated in the text. 53 The second and third categories are tied to the political
processes; the first category is not. 54 There is no reference in footnote four
to the noneconomic substantive due process rights recognized in Meyer and
Pierce, but that does not mean that these rights were to be equated with
economic rights. After all, the holding of Carolene Products is clearly
limited to economic legislation. Nevertheless, footnote four has been read
as drawing a definitive line between the specific exceptions it mentions,
which alone warrant strict scrutiny, and all other legislation, including both
economic regulation and legislation restricting the rights of family autonomy previously protected by substantive due process. This is where Ely's
theory draws the line, but insofar as it relies on footnote four, Ely's theory
puts more weight on Justice Stone's footnote than it should have to bear.
50. Id.at 152.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 152 n.4. As originally drafted, the footnote contained only the second and third
categories; the first was added at the suggestion ofChief Justice Hughes. See Lusky, FootnoteRedux: A
Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1096-1100 (1982).
53. CaroleneProducts, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
54. The first category refers to specific prohibitions of the Constitution, "such as" the Bill of
Rights. See id. Under the second category, legislation restricting the political processes, there are
citations to cases dealing with first amendment rights, such as dissemination of information and
peaceable assembly, but this category is clearly not intended to be coextensive with the first.
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Dictum in a footnote containing such phrases as "there may be" and "it is
unnecessary to consider now" could scarcely be considered as drawing a
final, definitive line between the polar extremes of rational basis review and
strict scrutiny. Viewed in perspective, footnote four is only a cautionary
note, 55 designed to prevent the Court's eagerness to repudiate Lochner
from leading to total abdication of its vital function of safeguarding
individual rights.
Had it not been for the Court's overly zealous rejection of Lochner, the
line drawn in CaroleneProducts need never have been drawn at all. If, as
Professor Henkin has suggested, the Court had simply excised the "laissezfaire excrescence" from substantive due process, it could have continued to
"subject all accommodations of private right to public good to bona-fide
balancing." 56 It could have continued to treat individual liberty as "primary" and required government to justify any restriction of it, "but the fact
that a regulation contributes to economic and social advancement [would
be] proof enough, for that is clearly a proper, and now indeed primary,
purpose of government." 57 As it has turned out, however, the excessively
lenient standard for economic legislation has had to be counterbalanced by
a strict standard to protect noneconomic individual rights. This has led to a
protracted and often bitter debate over which rights are sufficiently fundamental to deserve such stringent protection. 58 Much of the criticism of Roe
revolves around the question whether the right to make the abortion
55. See Lusky, supra note 52, at 1098 (The footnote was offered "not as a settled theorem of
government or Court-approved standard of judicial review, but as a starting point for debate.").
Professor Brest refers to it as an "almost off-hand suggestion." Brest, The Substance of Process,42
OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 132 (1981); see also Estreicher, PlatonicGuardiansof Democracy: John Hart Ely's
Role for the Supreme Court in the Constitution's Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 580 n. 122
(1981); Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1982). As Chief Justice,
Stone himself later cited footnote four for the proposition that "[tihere are limits to the extent to which
the presumption of constitutionality can be pressed, especially where the liberty of the person is
concerned." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,544 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concurring). Despite these
strong overtones of substantive due process, Stone's concurrence in Skinner ultimately relied on
procedural due process-the failure to grant a hearing before sterilization. Id. at 544-45.
For an interesting discussion of the current relevance of footnote four, see Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
56. Henkin, supra note 27, at 1427-28.
57. Id. at 1427. Professor Henkin concedes that, in the privacy cases, it was perhaps "too difficult
for most of the Justices candidly to rehabilitate substantive due process at one blow after decades of
silence and obloquy and within the fearful memories of New Deal survivors." Id. at 1428; see also
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 664 (1980).
58. Professor Henkin's analysis would focus less on the fundamental nature of the right and more
on the necessity for government interference with the right. See Henkin, supra note 27, at 1427-28.
In some areas, notably in equal protection analysis, the two-tiered structure has broken down,
leading to a third intermediate standard, now used in sex discrimination and some other cases. See, e.g.,
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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decision is fundamental enough to deserve heightened judicial protection. 59 It is now much too late to undo the history that led to the formulation
of the question in this way, but it is not too late to shift the emphasis in the
balance of private right versus public good away from the fundamentalness
of the right and toward the sufficiency of the state's justification for
restricting it. 6°
Even after its summary rejection of substantive due process, the Court
continued to give heightened protection to the substantive due process
rights identified in Meyer and Pierce, although at times it resorted to the
subterfuge of equal protection analysis. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,61 the
Court invoked a fundamental right to procreation to invalidate a statute that
required sterilization of persons three times convicted of certain crimes.
Justice Douglas' identification of that right had unmistakable roots in
Meyer:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race. . . . Any experiment which the State conducts is to
[the individual's] irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.62
In Skinner, the fundamental nature of the right involved was used as
justification for "strict scrutiny" of the classification of crimes in the
statute under an equal protection analysis. 63 The Court was thus able to
protect the substantive due process rights surrounding marriage and procreation without unduly disturbing the ghost of Lochner, so recently laid to
rest. 64
No plausible equal protection argument was available to Justice Douglas
65
twenty years later when he wrote the opinion of the Court in Griswold.
59. Both Justice Rehnquist and Dean Ely concede that what they prefer to call the right to
abortion is protected by the due process clause. What they do not concede is that it is "fundamental"
enough to be accorded any more protection than economic legislation. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 317-52.
61. 316 U.S 535 (1942).
62. Id. at 541.
63. Id. The analysis used in Skinner, which gives close scrutiny to classifications burdening
fundamental rights, was made more explicit in later equal protection cases involving the fundamental
right to move freely from state to state. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
64. Justice Douglas' 1942 opinion in Skinner followed his own opinion buryingLochner in Olsen v.
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
65. The facts of Skinner were easily adapted to equal protection analysis because the Oklahoma
statute involved in that case classified the persons who would be subjected to sterilization on the basis of
the crimes they had been convicted of committing. No similar classification scheme was contained in
the Connecticut statute challenged in Griswold. Nor was male/female classification subject to more
than minimum scrutiny when Griswoldwas decided. More recent efforts to develop an equal protection
rationale for privacy cases have relied either on a substantive equal protection rationale different from
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But during the years between Skinner and Griswold, he had been engaged
in a running battle with the Court majority over its substantive due process
approach to criminal procedure. The majority position was that only
procedural guarantees that the Court found to be "of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty" were applicable against the states under the
fourteenth amendment. 66 This "selective incorporation" approach was
opposed by Justices Douglas and Black, who favored total incorporation of
all Bill of Rights guarantees into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 67 The incorporation debate was still raging when Griswold
came before the Court, and the effects of the debate are reflected in the
opinions in that case.
II.

GRISWOLD-THE MANY FACES OF PRIVACY
Although a number of more traditional doctrinal threads were at handindeed, that is Griswold's fascination-Justice Douglas chose to weave the
68
opinion from gossamer of his own.

The Justices who decided Griswold were still haunted by the spectre of
Lochner. Both Black and Douglas had been appointed by Franklin Roosevelt for the avowed purpose of changing the course of decision on the Court,
particularly its hostility toward New Deal economic legislation. Both had
written opinions proclaiming the end of the Lochner era. 69 Obviously,
neither wanted to be the instrument for reviving Lochner and the substantive due process analysis it epitomized. Justice Black refused to take part in
the "classification burdening fundamental rights" analysis implicit in Skinner, see, e.g., Karst, The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword:Equal Citizenship Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1977), or on a sex discrimination rationale, see, e.g., Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
66. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 65 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (opinion of Cardozo, J.)).
67. E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The "selective
incorporation" approach adopted by the majority ultimately led to incorporation of most of the
procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The incorporation debate is discussed in, e.g., Henkin, supra note 27, at 1417-18.
68. Karst, supra note 57, at 653.
Considering the tarnished reputation of substantive due process in the years before Griswold
... , it is not surprising that Justice Douglas disclaimed reliance on it. . . . After so many
years of heaping scorn on Lochner v. New York, the Court has not found it easy to admit that
substantive due process has returned.
Id. at 664.
69. E.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (opinion of Douglas, J.);
Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (opinion of Black,
J.).
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the enterprise at all and wrote a blistering dissent. 70 Justice Douglas wrote
the opinion of the Court, using the penumbra rationale to avoid the stigma
of Lochner.71 Three other justices wrote concurring opinions,7 2 leaving the
Griswold rationale in fragmented confusion.
In Griswold, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives. 73 It was the third
time this statute had been before the Court. In two previous cases, the Court
had failed to reach the merits on grounds ofjusticiability and standing. 74 In
his dissent to one of these decisions, Poe v. Ullman,75 Justice Douglas had
frankly relied on the due process clause as an alternate ground for declaring
the statute unconstitutional. 76 But by the time he wrote the opinion of the
70. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,507 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart also
wrote a dissent, id. at 527, and joined Justice Black's.
71. Id. at 481-82 ("Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. State ofNew York...
should be our guide. But we decline that invitation ..
").
72. Justices Goldberg, White, and HarIan wrote concurring opinions, discussed infranotes 85-111
and accompanying text.
73. Section 53-32 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1938) provided:
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more
than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.
Defendants, the executive director and medical director of Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut,
were found guilty as accessories for giving medical advice to married persons. They were fined $100
each. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481.
74. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
75. 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 515 ("I am also clear that this Connecticut law as applied to this married couple deprives
them of 'liberty' without due process of law, as that concept is used in the Fourteenth Amendment.").
Justice Douglas' preferred ground of decision was the first amendment right of the doctor "to advise his
patients according to his best lights." Id. at 513. But he cited the substantive due process case, Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), as recognizing the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up
children," id. at 399, quoted in Poe, 367 U.S. at 517, and, while he maintained his incorporationist
position that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment "includes all of the first eight
amendments," 367 U.S. at 516, he departed from Justice Black's absolutist position by conceding that
the meaning of "liberty" in the due process clause is not "restricted and confined" to the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Id.
In addition to Meyer,Justice Douglas' Poedissent cited the "freedom to travel" case, Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958), and his own dissent in the captive audience case, Public Utils. Comm. v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting on privacy grounds). Poe, 367 U.S. at 516-17.
Justice Douglas closed his discussion of the meaning of "liberty" with a statement that foreshadowed
his penumbra opinion in Griswold: "'Liberty' is a conception that sometimes gains content from the
emanations ofotherspecific guarantees[citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958)] or from
experience with the requirements of a free society." Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
On the whole, the Douglas dissent in Poeis not incompatible with a substantive due process approach
to the right of privacy. Toward the end of his discussion ofprivacy, he made this statement: "This notion
of privacy is not drawn from the blue. It emanates from the totality of the constitutional scheme under
which we live." Id. at 521. Here he cited the Warren-Brandeis article on privacy, as well as Justice
Murphy's dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1946) ("I am not prepared to say that the
[due process clause] is entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights.").
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Court in Griswold four years later, Justice Douglas' flirtation with substantive due process was over. He rehabilitated Meyer and Pierce as first

amendment cases, although neither mentions the first amendment, 77 so that
they could be used to support his penumbra rationale. Despite his earlier
concession that due process liberty was not confined to the Bill of Rights,
Justice Douglas now strained to find the right of privacy in the penumbra, if

not the letter, of the Bill of Rights. 78 He wrote that the specific guarantees of
the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments "have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and

79
substance," and that these penumbras "create zones of privacy."

Griswold, he wrote, "concerns a relationship lying within" the zone of
privacy and a law that "seeks to achieve its goals by means having a

maximum destructive impact upon that relationship."

80 The

analysis ended

with a passing reference to overbreadth and the spectre of police searching

"the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms. ",81 Justice Douglas never mentioned either liberty or due process, even though it is obvious that his

penumbral right could be applied against a state statute only through the
82
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
77. Justice Harlan's Poe dissent concedes that Meyer and Pierce would probably have been decided
"by reference to the concepts of freedom of expression and conscience" derived from the first
amendment, if they had been decided at a later date. 367 U.S. at 544. It is a giant leap from this
concession to Justice Douglas' treatment of these cases as though they actually had been decided under
the first amendment:
By [Pierce], the right to educate one's children as one chooses is made applicable to the States by
the force of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. By [Meyer], the same dignity is given the right
to study the German language in a private school. In other words, the State may not, consistently
with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
78. "[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
"Justice Douglas's famous 'penumbras' and 'emanations' opinion drew upon the incorporation
legacy, rather than a doctrine of 'naked' substantive due process, and tortured the Bill of Rights into
yielding a protected zone of privacy that would not tolerate a law banning contraceptive use by married
couples." Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv. 981, 994
(1979).
79. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484, 485.
80. Id. at 485.
81. Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1958)).
82. His Poe dissent makes it clear that Douglas was aware of, and even receptive to, this analysis.
yet he disdained to make it explicit, probably in a studied effort to avoid the stigma of Lochner. He
succeeded only in evading, not avoiding, substantive due process; it remained implicit in his penumbral
rights rationale. Finding a right of privacy in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights would secure
protection only against federal action. To secure protection against state action, the right must be
somehow incorporated into the liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Consistent with his incorporationist position, Douglas was arguing, in effect, that the penumbras, as
well as the letter, of the Bill of Rights are incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The pure substantive due process position espoused by Justice Harlan would hold that the
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Justice Douglas modified the incorporationist position to hold that the
meaning of "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment due process clause is
limited to the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights andthe penumbras of
those enumerated rights. If he hoped by this refinement to persuade the
strict incorporationist, Justice Black, the effort did not bear fruit. To Justice
Black, the Griswold decision was nothing more nor less than a revival of
Lochner. Meyer and Pierce were equally discredited; the "natural law due
83
process philosophy" of those decisions was the same as that of Lochner.
There was no room in Justice Black's philosophy for penumbras or other
emanations; only the letter of the Bill of Rights could inform the Court's
search for the meaning of liberty in the due process clause. Anything more
would leave the members of the Court free to decide "what is or is not
constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or
unnecessary. "84 Ultimately, the penumbra rationale succeeded only in
fragmenting the Court and obscuring the constitutional derivation of the
right of privacy.
Although a bare majority of the Court did join in the Douglas opinion,
only Justice Clark was willing to rest solely on the penumbra rationale. 85
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion endorsed a substantive due process
rationale, though only briefly. 86 Most of his opinion is devoted to a
discussion of the ninth amendment, 87 which has compounded the confusion caused by Douglas' penumbras. Despite Justice Goldberg's express
right of privacy is part of the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause
irrespective of its position as a "penumbral" right. But note that Justice Harlan's due process right of
privacy is also derived from implications from some specific guarantees, especially the first, fourth, and
fifth amendments. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549-52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The real
distance between the two positions is therefore not nearly so great as the Griswold opinions suggest.
83. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 512. Justice Harlan pointed out that the restrictions placed on the Justices' discretion by
the strict incorporationist approach were "more hollow than real. 'Specific' provisions of the Constitution, no less than 'due process,' lend themselves as readily to 'personal' interpretations by judges
whose constitutional outlook is simply to keep the Constitution in supposed 'tune with the times."' Id.
at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring). There is an "I told you so" ring to Justice Harlan's opinion, as he noted
that the incorporation doctrine was being used here to "restrict" the protection accorded individual
rights rather than to expand them (as had usually been the case in the ongoing debate in the criminal
procedure cases). Id. at 500.
85. The other three justices.who joined the Douglas opinion also approved the substantive due
process rationale of Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined the Goldberg concurrence. Justices White and Harlan
concurred in the judgment without joining the opinion of the Court.
86. Id. ("I do agree that the concept of liberty [in the fourteenth amendment] protects those
personal rights that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights.").
Justice Goldberg did not, however, accept the incorporationist view that all of the Bill of Rights
guarantees are included in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. He thus subscribed
to the pure substantive due process approach endorsed by Justices Harlan and White.
87. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONsr. amend. IX.
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disclaimer88 and the clear import of the ninth amendment's language, 89
many who have difficulty in swallowing the penumbra rationale have
persisted in attributing the right of privacy to the ninth amendment. 90 The
ghost of Lochner, so effectively conjured up by Black's dissent, made

many courts and commentators wary of placing the constitutional roots of
the right of privacy where they clearly belong, in the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Nevertheless, a careful reading of all six
Griswold opinions establishes that it was a substantive due process case. 91
The Goldberg opinion, however briefly, does commit the threejustices who
subscribed to it to a substantive due process analysis. 92 Justice White's
94
93
concurrence is pure substantive due process, as is Justice Harlan's,
95
yielding a majority of five endorsing this analysis.
The ultimate exposition of substantive due process is found in the seventh
opinion in Griswold, Justice Harlan's Poe dissent, which is incorporated by
reference into his Griswold concurrence. 96 Justice Harlan identifies the
88. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added):
I do not take the position of my Brother Black. . . that the entire Bill of Rights is incorporated in
the Fourteenth Amendment, and I do not mean to imply that the Ninth Amendment is applied
against the States by the Fourteenth. Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth Amendment constitutes
an independent source of rights protected from infringement by either the States or the Federal
Government. Rather, the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that
fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an
intent that the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive.
89. The language of the amendment, quoted supra note 87, indicates an intent to make it clear that
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be applied to the Bill of Rights. See
Estreicher, supra note 55, at 559. This is how Justice Goldberg read it, as indicated by the passage
quoted supra note 88.
90. The district court opinion in Roe v. Wade, for example, had identified the ninth amendment as
the source of the right of privacy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
91. Many commentators recognized it as such. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 17; Henkin, supra
note 27; Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten, 64
MicH. L. REv. 235 (1965).
92. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
93. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
94. Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring).
95. Since the Douglas analysis was incomplete, see supra note 82 and accompanying text, it could
even be argued that all save the two dissenters were effectively following a substantive due process
approach. What distinguished Justices Douglas and Clark from the five justices advocating a pure
substantive due process approach was their implicit belief that the right of privacy could exist only if
found within the penumbra, if not the letter, of the Bill of Rights. The other five recognized no such
limitation.
The Goldberg opinion also endorsed penumbras, and Justice Clark silently accepted the "opinion of
the Court," so there were also five Justices who followed the Douglas rationale. See Kauper, supra note
91, at 249.
96. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (incorporating Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,522 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). Although Justice Harlan was dissenting from the Court's dismissal of Poe on justiciability
grounds, he discussed the merits because he thought the constitutional issues were "entangled with the
Court's conclusion as to the nonjusticiability of these appeals." Poe, 367 U.S. at 524 (Harlan, J.,
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constitutional violation as "an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of
privacy in the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual's
personal life.", 97 The individual's right of privacy is part of the liberty
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment:
Due Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through
the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the
supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to
roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions
from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. 98
Justice Harlan's broad concept of liberty could not be confined, as Justice
Black would have it, to the precise guarantees of the Bill of Rights:
[Tihe full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot
be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees
elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of
isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of
speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints. . . and which also recognizes, what
a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require

dissenting).
Kauper calls Harlan's Poe dissent the "ablest and most persuasive" and the "best opinion that has
been written on the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute." Kauper, supranote 91, at 242; see also
P. BOBBrrr, CONSTrroNAL FATE: THEORY OFTHE CONSTrTtnoN 175 (1982) (referring to Harlan's Poe
dissent as "an elegant example of constitutional ethical argument").
97. Poe, 367 U.S. at 539 (Harlan, L, dissenting).

98. Id. at 542.
Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against a background ofConstitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and historically developed. Though we
exercise limited and sharply restrained judgment, yet there is no "mechanical yardstick," no
"mechanical answer." The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which
follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must take "its place in
relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come."
Id. at 544 (quoting Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment. 99

Broad as this language is, Justice Harlan's privacy concept is nevertheless a carefully limited one. If the Connecticut statute had been nothing
more than an expression of the state's "moral judgment that all use of
contraceptives is improper," he would not necessarily have questioned the
state's judgment.' 0 0 His notion of privacy would not disturb the existing
laws expressing the state's moral judgments on marriage, divorce, homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, or suicide. '0' In Harlan's view, the flaw of
the Connecticut birth control statute lay rather with its choice of means: it
allowed the state "to enquire into, prove and punish married people for the
private use of their marital intimacy." 102 At first blush, this statement is
barely distinguishable from Justice Douglas' reference to invading "the
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms,"' 1 3 but the subsequent discussion
makes it clear that Justice Harlan's concern was not with the territorial
integrity of the marital home, but with the privacies of the life within the
home. 104 The invasion of privacy implicit in the Connecticut statute could
99. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
[I]t is the purposes of [the Bill of Rights] guarantees and not their text, the reasons for their
statement by the Framers and not the statement itself. . . which have led to their present status in
the compendious notion of "liberty" embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 544 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 546-47:
If we had a case before us which required us to decide simply, and in abstraction, whether the
moral judgment implicit in the application of the present statute to married couples was a sound
one, the very controversial nature of these questions would, I think, require us to hesitate long
before concluding that the Constitution precluded Connecticut from choosing as it has among
these various views.
But note that Justice Harlan did not say that his decision would certainly have been to uphold such a
statute. Dean Redlich hypothesizes that Justice Harlan might have voted with the majority in the
abortion cases. See Redlich, A Black-HarlanDialogue on Due Process and Equal Protection OverheardinHeavenandDedicatedto RobertB. McKay, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20,26 (1975). This is farfrom
self-evident, but clearly his concept of substantive due process is the one that offers the strongest
support for the Court's decision in Roe.
101. Poe, 367 U.S. at 546-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 548.
It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality altogether, or
to say who may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the
intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that
intimacy.
Id. at 553. Justice Harlan's protection of sexual autonomy was thus clearly limited to intimacy within
marriage. See Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 279-80 (1977).
103. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
104. Poe, 367 U.S. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("here we have not an intrusion into the home so
much as on the life which characteristically has its place in the home").
It is Douglas' emphasis on territorial integrity that permits Ely to conclude that the constitutional flaw
in the Connecticut statute was that it "would generate intolerably intrusive modes of data-gathering."
See infra text accompanying notes 138-39. The territorial emphasis also avoids the charge of
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have been accomplished "without any physical intrusion whatever into the
home." 10 5 Yet it "would surely be an extreme instance of sacrificing
substance to form were it to be held that the Constitutional principle of
privacy against arbitrary official intrusion comprehends only physical
invasions by the police." 106 Justice Harlan found this constitutional principle of privacy, as Brandeis had before him, in the values underlying the Bill
07
of Rights, particularly the fourth and fifth amendments.1
The strength of Justice Harlan's view as support for the constitutional
right of privacy derives from the fact that he looked to underlying principles rather than to emanations-to the core of the Bill of Rights rather than
to its penumbra. 108 Its principal weakness lies in the limitations he placed
upon the right-the deference he would have given the state's moral
judgments. 109 These limitations reflected Justice Harlan's essential conservatism, but the constitutional right of privacy he conceived was and is
capable of much wider application. It may well be that the limitations
Justice Harlan built into his concept of privacy contributed to the Court's
reluctance to embrace it, although clearly Lochnerphobia played a larger
Lochnerism, which was no doubt Douglas' reason for using it.
105. Poe, 367 U.S. at 549 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In elaborating on the sources of the constitutional right of privacy, Justice Harlan quoted a passage from Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886), that stated that the principles underlying the fourth and fourteenth amendments "apply to all
invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life." Poe, 367 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
106. Poe, 367 U.S. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The physical invasion would come within the
letter of the fourth amendment; the Connecticut statute violated its spirit-the principle underlying the
fourth amendment, as well as the first and fifth amendments. "[A] principle, to be vital, must be capable
of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,373
(1910), quoted in Poe, 367 U.S. at 551 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
107. Justice Harlan's views can be traced directly to Justice Brandeis' dissent in the wiretapping
case, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), which Harlan quoted in Poe:
The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments is much broader in scope. The
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They
knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 550 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
108. See 38 CoLO.L. REv. 267, 268 (1966). This is more than a semantic distinction. Justice
Douglas' avoidance of the Brandeis-Harlan approach was deliberate, and it resulted in an opinion that
gave little guidance as to the sources and the scope of the right ofprivacy. Identifying underlying values
was too reminiscent of the Lochner brand of substantive due process, and it would have undermined
Douglas' position in the incorporation debate. Harlan, on the other hand, had no fear of Lochner; he
embraced substantive due process openly and used the Bill of Rights as a source of constitutional
values, not as a substitute rationale. As a result, his opinion seems destined to outlast the penumbras.
109. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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role. But Justice Harlan's vision assumed new significance in 1973, when
Roe v. WadeI 10 was decided. By then the Court was ready to concede that
privacy was a substantive due process right. II'
III.

ROE v. WADE-RIGHT TO ABORTION OR RIGHT TO
PRIVACY?

This rightofprivacy, whether it befounded in the FourteenthAmendment's
concept ofpersonalliberty and restrictionsupon state action, as we feel it is,
or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 112

In this one crucial sentence, the Court in Roe v. Wade finally acknowledged
that the right of privacy enunciated in Griswold was a substantive due
process right' 13 and held that the right applied to the abortion decision. To
those who had been beguiled by Justice Douglas' talk of penumbras 114 or
misled by Justice Goldberg's discussion of the ninth amendment, this was
an intolerable forward leap, or an intolerable leap backward to Lochner.
Those who had accepted Griswold as articulating a right of personal
privacy based upon the substantive due process right recognized by the
Court since 1923115 had no difficulty in seeing Roe as a rational application
110. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
111. Id. at 153. The concession is a throwaway line in one crucial sentence of the opinion quoted
infra text accompanying note 112.
"[Slubsequent developments seem to have confirmed the White-Harlan view, and not the magical
mystery tour of the zones of privacy, as the prevailing doctrine of Griswold. " Lupu, supra note 78, at
994.
112. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
113. This fact is underscored in the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart, who had dissented in
Griswold. He concurred in Roe on the express understanding that privacy was now admitted to be a
substantive due process right. He explained the Court's prior evasiveness as follows:
In 1963, this Court, in Ferguson v. Skrupa . . .purported to sound the death knell for the
doctrine of substantive due process ....
Barely two years later, in [Griswold], the Court held a Connecticut birth control law unconstitutional. In view of what had been so recently said in Skrupa, the Court's opinion in Griswold
understandably did its best to avoid reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as the ground for decision. . . .[But] it was clear to me then, and it is equally clear
to me now, that the Griswold decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the
Connecticut statute substantially invaded the "liberty" that is protected by the Due Process Clause
.... As so understood, Griswold stands as one in a long line ofpre-Skrupa cases decided under
the doctrine of substantive due process, and Inow accept it as such.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 167-68 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
114. E.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 937-43.
115. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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of that right, amply supported, though not compelled, by both precedent
and principle. 116
The trouble with Roe is that the Court's opinion, like the multiple
opinions in Griswold, tends to obscure rather than elucidate the analytical
bases of the decision. 117 The Court spent considerably more time discussing the history of abortion 1 8 than it did explicating the constitutional bases
of the right of privacy. 1 9 After a brief discussion of the privacy cases, it
concluded that the right of privacy includes the abortion decision and is
"fundamental." 120 The Court then had to balance the pregnant woman's
privacy rights against "important state interests in regulation." 121 The state
interests identified as legitimate are the interests in maternal health and in
protecting prenatal life. 122 The state's interest in maternal health was

116. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 533 B.U.L.
REV. 765,777 (1973). In answering Ely's criticism ofRoe, Heymann and Barzelay noted that whether
Roe represents a "quantum jump" in constitutional doctrine, Ely, supra note 3, at 936 n.93, depends
largely on "how a student of the Court's decisions reads the preceding decisions. Narrowing the
decisions from Meyer through Eisenstadtcertainly allows one to draw a 'quantum jump' conclusion."
Heymann & Barzelay, supra, at 771 n.61; see also Gerety, supranote 102, at 273-74; Sedler, supranote
16, at 119 n. 167; infra text accompanying notes 138-41.
117. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 144:
The Court's decision in the Abortion Cases was, and remains, problematic in part-in major part,
I think-because the Court failed to articulate anything like a rigorous argument in support of its
bare assertion that, in the previability period of pregnancy, a woman's interest in terminating her
pregnancy is weightier than government's interest in preventing the taking of fetal life.
See also Epstein, Substantive Due Processby any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. Cr.
REv. 159; Heymann & Barzelay, supra note 116, at 765.
118. Roe, 410U.S. at 129-47.
119. Id. at 152-56. These four pages consist largely of strings of citations, joined by terse,
conclusory text. A single paragraph listing some of the Court's decisions protecting privacy under the
first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments ends with the statement that only personal rights
deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are included within the
constitutional "guarantee of personal privacy." Id. at 152. The Court concludes that the right of privacy
has "some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
and child rearing and education." Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 153, 155. The holding of the case is contained in the single sentence quoted supra text
accompanying note 112: "This right of privacy. . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153. To justify its application of the right of privacy to
abortion, the Court cited the detriment the state imposes on a pregnant woman when it denies her the
choice of abortion. Id.
121. Id. at 154. Since the right of privacy is "fundamental," regulation of the abortion decision can
be justified only by a "compelling state interest," and legislation "must be narrowly drawn to express
only the legitimate state interests at stake." Id. at 155.
122. Id. at 155-56. The interests identified were derived from state and lower federal court
decisions:
Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy...
is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not absolute and is
subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state interests as to protection of health,
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quickly disposed of: abortion in the early stages of pregnancy is safer than
childbirth, therefore the state has no genuine interest in maternal health that
would be furthered by laws prohibiting or regulating abortion.123 At the
point when abortion becomes more dangerous than its alternative, childbirth, at "approximately the end of the first trimester," the state may
regulate abortion "in ways that are reasonably related to [protection of]
124
maternal health."
The state's interest in protecting prenatal life required more extensive
discussion. The state argued in Roe that a fetus is a "person" under the
fourteenth amendment, whose "right to life" is protected under the due
process clause.125 The Court surveyed the contexts in which the word
"person" is used in the Constitution and concluded that the fourteenth
amendment was not intended to apply to the unborfi. 126 But even as
"potential human life," the fetus would be entitled to some protection by
the state. The question is: at what point in time does the state's interest in
protecting the fetus become compelling? The total prohibition of abortion
under Texas law implicitly identified that point as the moment of conception. 127 The Court, surveying the positions taken by various religions,
the medical profession, and the law of tort and property, concluded that
"the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense." 128 This suggests live birth as the relevant dividing line, but the
29
Court instead chose an earlier point, viability. 1
The Court did not explain its choice, but the reasons for it seem fairly
clear. In the Court's balance, the fundamental privacy rights of the pregnant woman outweigh the state's interest in protecting fetal rights until the
fetus has acquired the capacity for independent life. At this point, the state's
medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant.
Id. at 155.
123. Id. at 163.
124. Id. at 164. The Court's use of the word "approximately," in identifying the point where the
state's interest in maternal health became compelling, assumed significance ten years after Roe, when
improvements in medical techniques had pushed back the threshhold of state involvement. See City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). The majority adhered to the
trimester approach, emphasizing its flexibility.
125. Roe, 4 I0 U.S. at 156-57. The right to life argument, if sustained, would raise interesting state
action problems, for it is against deprivation of life by the state, not the mother, that the due process
clause affords protection. See Epstein, supra note 117, at 179-80. Nevertheless, a holding that a fetus is
a "person" entitled to protection under the fourteenth amendment would enhance the state's duty to
protect it, as parenspatriae,even against its parent. It could even be argued that equal protection would
require that abortion be treated as a form of homicide, or at least child abuse.
126. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58.
127. This was the position argued by the state of Texas. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
128. Id. at 162.
129. Id. at 164-65.
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interest can no longer be distinguished from its general interest in preventing the taking of human life, and abortion becomes virtually indistinguishable from infanticide. 130 The state's interest then outweighs the
pregnant woman's rights, so as to justify regulation or even prohibition of
abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life or health of the
mother. 131 Similarly, the state's health interest increases in weight throughout the pregnancy as the dangers of abortion increase, but at no point does
the state's interest in maternal health alone justify total prohibition of
32
abortion. 1
The opinion implicitly conceptualizes fetal rights as growing over time
in a manner that roughly parallels the physical development of the fetus. As
the fetus grows, so does the likelihood of its achieving independent existence, until it reaches the point of viability. The law has traditionally
considered the "acquisition of a capacity for independent existence" as
significant in the acquisition of fetal rights. 133 In that respect, laws restricting abortion were logically inconsistent with other law. 134 The reason for
the inconsistency is suggested by the underlying moral and religious
35
dispute over the question of "when life begins." 1
At one point, the Court seemed ready to acknowledge a first amendment
basis for its decision: "In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting
one theory of life, Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman
...
. "136 Since "all this" refers back to the Court's earlier discussion of
the views of various religions, as well as law and medicine, on the question
130. See Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of
Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689, 734 (1976).
131. This exception indicates that the Court is still giving fractionally greater weight to the
mother's rights than to those of the viable fetus.
The added weight given to the mother's rights would be easier tojustify if only her right to life were so
weighted. King argues that the "interests of mother and viable fetus should be weighed equally," King,
The JuridicalStatus of the Fetus:A Proposalfor Legal Protectionof the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REv.
1647, 1683 (1979), because there is "no relevant difference between a viable fetus and a newborn." Id.
at 1676; cf. Epstein, supra note 117, at 184.
132. The prohibition on state health regulation in the early stages ofpregnancy arises from the fact
that, when abortion is safer than childbirth, there is no rational relationship between state regulation and
the interest in maternal health asserted to justify it. When abortion becomes more dangerous than
childbirth, the state's paternalistic interest in protecting the pregnant woman from the health risks she
chooses to take are never strong enough in themselves to override her freedom of choice.
133. King, supra note 131, at 1676. King points out that live birth formerly was "the point at which
the capacity criterion was satisfied. Today viability precedes birth, and therefore birth is no longer the
event most appropriately satisfying the capacity criterion." Id.
134. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 161: "In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to
endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the
unborn except. . . when the rights are contingent upon live birth."
135. Id. at 159.
136. Id. at 162.
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of when life begins, this statement suggests that abortion is a matter of
conscience, protected by the first amendment. If so, it is arguable that "by
adopting one theory of life" the state of Texas was violating the establishment clause, and that by enforcing that theory on all pregnant women,
regardless of their own religious beliefs, the state was also violating the free
exercise clause. A freedom of belief argument could also be derived from
free speech guarantees of the first amendment, based on West Virginia State
Boardof Education v. Barnette.137 But the Court never developed the point
beyond that one sentence, choosing instead to rely entirely on the substantive due process right of privacy.
This is rational analysis, adequately supported by relevant legal precedent and responsive to the complex human problem it addresses. But
because the analysis is not articulated with sufficient clarity, Roe is vulnerable to attack by anyone who is not prepared to accept Meyer and
Griswold as valid applications of substantive due process. Thus Ely read
Griswold as holding the Connecticut ban on the use of contraceptives
unconstitutional because it "would generate intolerably intrusive modes of
data-gathering," 138 or as protecting activities within the home. 139 He read
Roe as a right-to-abortion case, and so could find no rational connection
between the two. 140 When the right of privacy is fragmented in this way, it
becomes possible to attack any segment of the right as judicial legislation,
unsupported by precedent. If, however, the earlier cases are read as recognizing "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child," the
application to the abortion decision becomes not merely defensible, but
virtually inevitable. 141
It is just this kind of fragmentation of the right of privacy that animates
the dissents in Roe. In Justice White's view, the Court "simply fashions and
announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with
scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with
137. 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
138. Ely, supra note 3, at 930.
139. Id. at 930 n.73. Ely interpreted Justice Harlan's Poe v. Ullman dissent as "extending
heightened protection to activities . . .customarily performed in the home," and found this basis
inapplicable to abortion. Id. This territorial view of privacy might have been better supported by
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), but this rationale was expressly repudiated in Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973). In any case, there is no reason other than a general
aversion to substantive due process to so limit the constitutional right of privacy.
140. Ely, supra note 3, at 922, 941.
141.

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972), quoted in Roe, 410 U.S. at 169-70 (Stewart, J.,

concurring). "From this language in Eisenstadtto the abortion decisions is neither so far-fetched nor so
unwarranted a step as some commentators have suggested." Gerety, supra note 102, at 273.
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sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes." 142 As
so characterized, Roe is clearly an "exercise of raw judicial power," and an
143
"improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review."
Justice Rehnquist also characterized the right of privacy as a "right to
abortion," 144 thus effectively severing Roe from its roots in Meyer and
Griswold.145 His technique joins fragmentation with literalism. He assumes that constitutional "privacy" has the same meaning as "privacy" in
the dictionary sense, involving notions of secrecy and seclusion,' 46 then
attacks the constitutional right because it does not fit the dictionary definition. 147 One may quarrel with the Court's choice of the word "privacy" to
identify a right that has at least as much to do with personal autonomy as it
does with secrecy or seclusion, 148but it is disingenuous to criticize the right
49
because the label is perceived as inappropriate. 1
It is undoubtedly too late to rechristen the constitutional right with a
name less laden with established meaning, even if that would satisfy the
critics. The right of privacy by any other name would still offend those who
142. Roe, 410 U.S. at 221-22 (White, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 222. Justice White then sought to trivialize the abortion decision; he accused the Court
of valuing the "convenience of the pregnant mother" more than the life of the fetus. Id. This argument is
discussed infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that Justice White does not attack substantive due process per se. Recall that he
concurred in Griswold, employing a pure substantive due process analysis. See supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
144. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, L,dissenting). Although Justice White does not use the term
"right to abortion," his "new constitutional right for pregnant mothers," id. at 221 (White, J.,
dissenting), clearly means the same thing.
145. Nor, in Rehnquist's view, is the privacy involved inRoe "even a distant relative of the freedom
from searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment. . .which the Court has referred to as
embodying a right to privacy." Id. at 172. Rehnquist insists on treating the various aspects of the
constitutional right of privacy as isolated pinpricks, to borrow Justice Harlan's metaphor. Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Recall that it was precisely the connection
between fourth amendment privacy and the right of privacy involved in Griswold and Roe that Justice
Harlan made in his Poe dissent by looking at the values underlying both. Justice Rehnquist's skepticism
will not permit him to look beneath the surface of enumerated rights for underlying values; his argument
therefore must deal only with externals.
146. See, e.g., WEBsTER's SEvEmnNEwCo
IaTDcrIoNRY677 (1971). Compare Gavison's
definition of privacy as a complex of three elements, "secrecy, anonymity, and solitude." Her
definition expressly excludes noninterference with decisions such as abortion, which she considers to
be more properly categorized as questions of "liberty" rather than privacy. Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits ofLaw, 89 YALE L.J. 421,433,436-38 (1980). But see Gerety, supra note 102, at 236 (defining
privacy as "an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity").
147. Roe, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (an abortion is not "private" in the "ordinary
usage of that word"). But surely any competent lawyer is aware that even words with accepted meanings
in ordinary usage-the word "fraud" comes to mind, but there are others-take on more particularized
meaning when used to embody legal concepts.
148. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 27.
149. Others have also criticized the privacy semantics. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 1.
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object to applying it to the abortion decision. In any case, the label is not as
inappropriate in the context of abortion as is has been made to appear.
Justice Rehnquist's attack proceeds on the assumption that it is the abortion
itself that is constitutionally protected-i.e., that Roe is a right-to-abortion
case. But it is not the abortion itself, but the decision whether to have an
abortion, that is shielded both from public view and from public interference. 150 That decision is private, even in the dictionary sense of secrecy
and seclusion. The distinction between the right to abortion and the right to
make the abortion decision is crucial to the definition and scope of the
right. A right to abortion would protect the pregnant woman only if she
decided to have an abortion. Protecting the decision also protects her right
15
not to have an abortion.
The term "privacy" is appropriate in this context because it identifies a
common characteristic of the kinds of activities that are protected in its
name. Activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, and
family relationships all involve intimate aspects of the individual's personal
life. 152 They are concerned with the individual's private, as opposed to
public, life. It is in this area that government interference is most intrusive
and least justified. 153 The more complex, the more urbanized our social and
economic structure becomes, the more difficult it becomes to attain physical seclusion, the more the individuals within that structure need the
emotional seclusion that is provided by keeping their private lives truly
private. The constitutional right of privacy recognizes that need and protects it from intrusion by government. This is but a logical and necessary
extension of the concept of liberty embodied in our Constitution.
150. See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Forword:Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
ProcessofLife andLaw, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1973); cf. Gerety, supranote 102, at 274 (referring
to the decision "to have or forego" an abortion).
151. Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (discussing
compulsory contraception); Appleton, The Abortion-Funding Cases and Population Control: An
ImaginaryLawsuit (andsome Reflections on the UncertainLimits ofReproductive Privacy), 77 MIcH.
L. REV. 1688, 1704 (1979). If some future legislature, concerned with overpopulation, were to pass a
compulsory abortion statute, the right-to-life argument would have to rely squarely on Roe v. Wade, and
unless the state's interest in curbing population could be characterized as compelling, the argument
would prevail. Such a case could not properly be characterized as the Court constructing a new "rightnot-to-have-an-abortion." It would not even be an extension of Roe, but merely a valid application of the
principle established by Roe.
152. These are the applications identified by the Roe majority. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. Karst
conceives the right protected as "the freedom of intimate association." Karst, supra note 57, at 625.
Intimacy is also an integral feature of Gerety's definition. See Gerety, supranote 102, at 245,273-74.
153. The lack of justification for government interference is an important factor in distinguishing
modern privacy cases from the Lochner line. See infra notes 380-84 and accompanying text; see also
Perry, supra note 130; Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REV.
1156, 1198-1242 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
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Nowhere is the need for protection from government interference greater
than it is in the abortion decision. "A woman's decision to have or forego an
abortion is perhaps more than any other she makes an intimate one,
expressive of both her identity and her autonomy." 154 A pre-Roe abortion
decision recognized the significance as well as the personal intimacy of the
abortion decision:
Certainly the interests of a woman in giving of her physical and emotional self
during pregnancy and the interests that will be affected throughout her life by
the birth and raising of a child are of a far greater degree of significance and
personal intimacy than the right to send a child to private school. . . or the
right to teach a foreign language .... 155
Justice White, on the other hand, identifies the woman's interest as mere
"convenience." 156 Since the substantive due process mode of analysis
involves weighing the relative interests of the pregnant woman and the
state in the abortion decision, trivializing the woman's interest skews the
balance in the state's favor. So, when Justice White weighs the "convenience of the pregnant mother" against the state's interest in preserving
fetal life, 157 the outcome of the balancing is virtually preordained.
154. Gerety, supra note 102, at 274.
155. Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D.Conn. 1972), quoted in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113,170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). In Karst's view, the abortion cases were concerned with "the
power of women to choose their roles in a male-dominated society, a power which the pre-Roe
antiabortion statutes severely restricted." Karst, supra note 65, at 58 n.325.
156. Roe, 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
157. Id. Justice White recognizes, of course, that abortions may be sought for a variety ofreasons,
among them "convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the embarrassment of
illegitimacy, etc.," id. at 221, but this listing hardly acknowledges the seriousness of the decision.
"Embarrassment" is not all that is involved in illegitimacy, especially if the woman is physically or
emotionally immature, and "economics" hardly acknowledges the desperation of the welfare mother
faced with another pregnancy that threatens to perpetuate her status as such. Pregnancy involves much
more than nine months of a woman's life; it may radically alter the course of her entire life. The fact that
some women, if given the right to make the decision to abort, may make it for insufficient or even trivial
reasons, does not justify withholding the right to choose from all women. The right to decide
necessarily includes the right to make the "wrong" decision. Only if abortion is the wrong choice in
every conceivable circumstance would an absolute prohibition be justified.
Ely also trivializes, but he is more ambivalent than Justice White. On one hand, he equates a
"woman's freedom to choose an abortion" with "anyone's freedom to do what he wants," and
concludes that the abortion decision is entitled to no greater protection than any other decision. Ely,
supranote 3, at 935. Elsewhere, however, he concedes that "[h]aving an unwanted child can go a long
way toward rining a woman's life," and that the child "may not fare so well either." Id. at 923 & n.26.
What he will not concede is that the Court should have any power to do anything about it. Id. at 926
("the Court has no business getting into that business"). It is the spectre of Lochner that he feels
forecloses recognition of any such power in the Court. Id. at 937-43. What Ely ends up saying, in
effect, is that the danger of Lochnerism is so great that rining a few women's lives is not too great a
price to pay to avoid it.
One must resist the temptation to point out that the sacrifice Ely is willing to make to Lochner is
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If there is any doubt about the extent of the burden placed on some
women by laws prohibiting abortion, the prevalence of illegal abortions
prior to 1973 offers some clue. 158 It is highly unlikely that so many women
would have been willing to risk pain, disability, and even death for trivial
reasons. 159 But under pre-Roe abortion laws, a pregnant woman who was
not physically, emotionally, or financially able to spend the next twenty
years of her life caring for a child had only one realistic legal alternative:
she could serve as breeding stock for the adoption market. 160 It is not
surprising that many women chose instead to face the hazards of illegal
abortion. This does not mean, of course, that abortion, legal or illegal, is
ever the right choice morally. It indicates only that to many women, despite
the hazards, it represented the least objectionable of several highly unsatisfactory alternatives.
If the enormity of the intrusion on the woman's liberty (privacy in this
context seems too small a word) is to be weighed against the fetus' chance
for life, 161 the balance must take account of the risks it faces both before and
after birth. It is too seldom noted that the child's life, if it survives gestation
and birth, is inextricably bound up with the life of the mother who feels
incapable or unwilling, for whatever reason, to give it life and sustenance.
The life of the unwanted child is usually far from happy. 162 Granting that the
quality of anyone's life is no ground for terminating that life once it has
one that could not conceivably be exacted from him, for by no means all of Roe's critics are male.
Indeed, there is some evidence that men tend to be more supportive of freedom of decision in abortion
than females. See Uslander & Weber, Public Supportfor Pro-ChoiceAbortion Policies in the Nation
and State: Changes and Stability After the Roe and Doe Decisions, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1772, 1779

(1979).
158.

The substantiality of the burdens of unwanted pregnancy "is shown graphically by the extent

to which pregnant women would suffer personal risk and pain to obtain abortions prior to Roe v. Wade."
Bennett, Abortion and JudicialReview: Of Burdens and Benefits, Hard Cases and Some Bad Law. 75

Nw. U.L. REv. 978, 992 (1981). See J. CHOPER, supra note 15, at 119 (citing estimates that criminal
abortions decreased as much as 70 percent after Roe).
159. "In substance, the secular case against a severely restrictive law rests upon evidence that the
demand for abortions is so widespread and insistent that forcing the satisfaction of this demand into
illicit channels results in financial victimization and death for thousands of women." Schwartz, Morals
Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 684 (1963).
160. See Glover, Matters of Life andDeath, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 30, 1985, at 19 (referring to

this alternative as "making surrogate motherhood compulsory").
161. This is the way the balancing is done by the Roe dissenters and most of the critics of the
abortion decisions.
162. See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630,677-78 (E.D.N.Y.) (reporting on various studies of
unwanted children), rev'd sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Ely, supra note 3,at 923 &
n.26; see also supra note 157.

The effect of forced childbearing is particularly burdensome on the poor. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S.
438, 456-57 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("I am appalled at the ethical bankruptcy of those who
preach a 'right to life' that means . . . a bare existence in utter misery for so many poor women and
their children.").
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begun, 163 any balance between the pregnant woman's interests and the
state's interest in the potential life she carries in her womb must take

account of reality.
The pregnant woman's side of the balance draws added weight from first
amendment values implicated in the right of privacy. Abortion laws are
morals legislation: the state makes a moral judgment, based on strong
moral and religious beliefs held by substantial segments of the population,
and enforces that judgment on all pregnant women, regardless of their
individual moral and religious beliefs. 164 In this respect, abortion laws
represent the same kind of enforcement of official belief that the Court
condemned in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1 65 and
Wooley v. Maynard.166 Other first amendment values are implicated as
well, notably associational rights 67 and the free exercise and establishment
163. The advances in medical science that make possible prenatal detection of fetal abnormalities
underscore the fact that it is far safer to permit the life-or-death decision to be made before birth, or
before viability, while it is still possible to identify a dividing line between fetal life and other forms of
human life. Once the child is born alive, or even once it is capable of surviving the ordeal of birth, no
principled basis remains to distinguish it from other human beings-from the old, the sick, the
handicapped, the helpless. However tenuous the distinction may be between previable and viable fetus,
or between fetus and newborn infant, see Glover, supra note 160, at 19-23, there is a perceptible
dividing line. Once the child is born alive, decisions whether to treat its infirmities (with no possibility
of input from the child itself) are no longer rationally distinguishable from similar decisions concerning
the aged or infirm. The real slippery slope begins at birth. Placing the dividing line for the abortion
decision at viability rather than at birth simply creates an added zone of protection for prenatal life.
164. In the larger sense, of course, most legislation involves the enforcement of moral judgments,
much of it religiously based (e.g., thou shalt not steal). The difference between such legislation and that
referred to here as "morals legislation" lies in the degree of secular justification for it, in terms of social
need, as well as the extent to which various religions and philosophies are in agreement. See infranote
168; cf. infratext accompanying notes 317-44. There is a wide divergence of views on abortion among
the major religions in this country. See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 690-702 (E.D.N.Y.)
(outlining the positions of various faiths on the abortion issue), rev'dsub nom. Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980); cf. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 109 ("[A] right answer [to a political-moral question]
frequently represents, in the United States, a point at which a variety of philosophical and religious
systems of moral thought and belief converge.").
165. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute).
166. 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating a state law that required auto license plates to bear the motto
"Live Free or Die"); see also Developments, supra note 153, at 1209-10, 1214-16.
[T]he Constitution strictly limits state power to impose on its citizens any particularview of what
moral, religious, or ethical values are orthodox. Crucial decisions about childbearing and
childrearing are thus allocated to the family in part because majoritarian control of this process
would allow the state impermissibly to standardize its citizens.
Id. at 1215-16; see also L. TRIBE, supranote 16, § 15-6, at 902-03 (citing Meyer andPierceas limiting
"governmental power to homogenize the beliefs and attitudes of the populace").
There is a significant difference between doing something because one believes it to be morally
right and wanting others compelled by the law to do that same thing whether or not they believe it is
morally right. In a traditionally and proudly pluralistic society, this is a distinction that matters.
Perry, supra note 130, at 727.
167. Professor Karst recasts the right of privacy in terms of "freedom of intimate association."
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clauses, 168 but such values do not suffice in themselves to account for the
autonomy aspects of the right of privacy. 169 Only the notion of liberty in the
due process clause itself is broad enough to contain the full scope of the
right of the individual to conduct her private life without undue interference from government. 170 First amendment rights give added support to
that right, but they do not define it. Nevertheless, the importance of first
amendment values to the concept of constitutional privacy makes one wish
that the Court had developed this theme beyond that one enigmatic sentence: "[W]e do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may
71
override the rights of the pregnant woman."1
72
An argument can also be made under the equal protection clause. 1
Laws affecting reproductive autonomy profoundly affect the situation of
women in society,173 but the equal protection analysis currently employed
by the Supreme Court in sex discrimination cases does not readily lend
itself to such an argument. For one thing, it has been applied only to
situations in which men and women are treated differently, though similarly situated; 174 in reproductive capacity and function, men and women
Karst, supra note 57. Karst acknowledges close ties to the first amendment, but maintains that the
substantive due process right "can stand on [its] own." Id. at 654.
168. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. Professor Tribe at one time proposed a
justification for Roe that relied heavily on first amendment values, including both associational rights
and the establishment clause. Tribe, supra note 150. Other commentators have proposed similar
justifications. See Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391,
407-10 (1963); Law, supra note 65, at 1026 n.249; Morgan, Roev. Wade and the Lessons of the Pre-Roe
Case Law, 77 MICH. L. Rev. 1724, 1743-44 (1979); Comment, The Establishment Clause and
Religious Influences on Legislation, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 944 (1980). Tribe appears to have retreated from
this position in more recent writings. See L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 928; Law, supra note 65, at 1026
n.249 (1984).
Professor Henkin recognizes that "our laws can be followed back to roots in the Bible," but the
"constitutional issue begins to stir when we deal with legislation reflecting our particular moralitywhen the religious origins are more apparent and persistent, when the law is not common to all civilized
nations, when it has no clear utilitarian basis." Henkin, supra, at 408.
169. But see Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 62 (1974) (identifying "autonomous self-determination" as the
central value underlying the first amendment).
170. See Karst, supra note 57; cf McRae v. Califano, 491 F Supp. 630, 741-42 (E.D.N.Y.)
(invalidating the Hyde Amendment on a rationale combining first amendment rights ofconscience with
fifth amendment liberty), rev'd sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
171. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
172. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 65, at 53-59; Law, supra note 65.
173. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L.
REV. 375,375 (1985); Karst, supranote 65, at 58 (arguing that the abortion question is "a feminist issue
• . . going to women's position in society in relation to men); see also Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of
Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-ScientificSieve, 36 HASTINGs L.J. 155, 169 (1984) (stating
that Roe "was defensible only because it helped to empower women in society by putting them on a
more equal footing with men. Men don't have to be involuntary incubators, even for their own
children. ").
174. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Law, supra note 65.
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clearly are not similarly situated. For another, the Court has explicitly held
that discrimination on account of pregnancy is not sex discrimination. 175
And, although laws affecting pregnancy clearly have a disproportionate
impact on women, the Court requires proof of discriminatory intent or
purpose before such an impact will trigger heightened scrutiny. 176 Faced
with these obstacles, the equal protection argument must fall back on broad
substantive principles of equality, an area in which there are few, if any,
relevant precedents. 177 Nevertheless, the fact that there is no conceivable
instance in which the law could, or would, impose a comparable burden on
78
males should count for something in the constitutional balance. 1
In any case, equal protection analysis should not be resorted to simply as
a device to avoid substantive due process, as it has been in the past. 179 The
concept of due process liberty is the most appropriate repository for the
rights of privacy and autonomy protected in Griswold and Roe. What is
needed is for the Court to be more forthright in dealing with Lochner. Until
it articulates a principled basis for distinguishing Lochner from the later
substantive due process cases, the right of privacy will remain vulnerable
to critics both on and off the Court.
IV. ROE-THE NONINTERPRETIVIST PARADIGM
Had it ended with Griswoldv. Connecticut, in 1965, the right to privacy
might have gone largely without criticism. 80
The abortion cases sparked the latest phase of the perennial debate over
the legitimacy and scope of judicial review. Roe v. Wade has been called the
175. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Although the Court's similar holding in a Title VII
case, General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), has been overruled by Congress, Geduldig
would still apply to equal protection claims. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (1982).
176. Personnel Adm'rv. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(racial impact). There is a certain irony in the requirement of intent or purpose in sex discrimination
cases, for the Court has frequently struck down statutes because they were "the accidental byproduct of
a traditional way of thinking about females," Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,223 (1977) (Stevens,
J., concurring), thus tacitly conceding that sex discrimination is often unconscious and thus at least
arguably unintentional.
177. Professor Karst identifies the "substantive core" of the equal protection clause as the
"principle of equal citizenship," which he finds implicated in, e.g., Eisenstadt andRoe. He views these
cases as "woman's role" cases, involving "some of the most important aspects of a woman's
independence, her control over her own deitiny." Karst, supra note 57, at 57.
"The requirement that similarly situated individuals be treated the same does not exhaust the idea of
equality. Equality is a substantive goal ....
Law, supra note 65, at 1009.
178. "[M]ost of us now see that if men could get pregnant the right to choose would have had a
central place in the debate long ago." Glover, supra note 160, at 19; see also Tribe, supra note 173.
179. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), discussed supra notes 61-64 and
accompanying text.
180. Gerety, supranote 1, at 143.
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paradigm of noninterpretivist review. 181 Ely characterizes it as "the clearest
example of noninterpretivist 'reasoning' . . . in four decades."1 82 Fearing
a return to the unbridled judicial discretion that characterized the Lochner
era, he has devised a theory of judicial review that justifies the egalitarian
reforms of the Warren Court while rejecting all other forms of noninterpretivist review, 183 especially Roe. Indeed, Ely credits Roe with precipitating a resurgence of interpretivism. 184 Roe, he writes, "forced all of
185
us who work in the area to think about which camp we fall into."
Ely's aversion to Roe is, at least in part, a reaction to the "politically
conservative" makeup of the Burger Court. "[O]bservers who might
earlier have been content to let the justices enforce their own values (or
their rendition of society's values) are now somewhat uneasy about
doing so and are more likely to pursue an interpretiVist line, casting
their lot with the values of the framers." 186 Choper has characterized the
"often harsh and apocalyptic criticism" of the Burger Court by
"libertarian admirers of the Warren Court" as a "whose-ox-is-gored"
181. See, e.g., Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent
Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 417,420 (1976) (characterizing Roe as "perhaps the paradigmatic example of
a court constitutionalizing nonconstitutional values"); Lupu, ConstitutionalTheory and the Searchfor
the Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 579, 583 (1983) ("Roe cut fundamental rights adjudication
loose from the constitutional text.").
182. J. ELY, supra note 6, at 2.
183. By Ely's definition, noninterpretivist review is judicial review enforcing "norms that cannot
be discovered within the four comers" of the Constitution. Id. at 1.
184. Ely defines interpretivism as judicial review confined to "enforcing norms that are stated or
clearly implicit in the written Constitution." Id. at 1. Perry similarly defines noninterpretive judicial
review as "constitutional policymaking." M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 6.
185. J. ELY, supra note 6, at 2-3.
186. Id. at 3.
This frankly pragmatic approach gives a flavor of gamesmanship to the current interpretivist/
noninterpretivist debate, lending credence to Professor Tribe's early characterization of it as a "red
herring." L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 11-2, at 566; see also Miller, Toward a Definition of "The
Constitution," 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 633, 701 (1983) (characterizing the controversy over the legitimacy
of judicial review as "essentially incoherent and unresolvable"); Richards, Moral Philosophy and the
Searchfor FundamentalValues in ConstitutionalLaiv,42 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 319 (1983) (characterizing
Ely's argument as "startlingly specious").
A strong flavor of gamesmanship also surfaces in Professor Perry's acknowledgment that his judicial
review argument is based on a premise with which he does not necessarily agree. See Commentary,
Morning Session, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 525, 529 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Commentary]:
The problem is the legitimacy of constitutional policymaking by the judiciary. I take as a given
the principle that such policymaking must be electorally accountable. I make no brief in support of
the principle. Rather, it is a part of my strategy in developing a theory of judicial review. In this
way, I can play the game the way those who take this principle seriously would have me play it and
say that, even taking this principle seriously, I can construct a reasonable justification for
constitutional policymaking by the judiciary. Now if I could not do that, I personally would be
willing to examine the axiom.
In fact, Perry said that he does not consider the kind of review the Court has been exercising in human
rights cases as "all that untethered." Id.
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approach. 187 Ely himself professes agreement with Roe's result, 188 but
he is prepared to sacrifice the result in order to curb feared excesses by
the Burger Court. 189 He would not trust this Court to venture far beyond
the constitutional text.
The root of the problem is Alexander Bickel's counter-majoritarian
difficulty, 190 as amplified by Judge Bork-"the seeming anomaly of judicial supremacy in a democratic society.'191 In Bork's view, the anomaly is
dissipated by our "Madisonian" model of government, which is major-

itarian but contains a counter-majoritarian premise, "for it assumes there
are some areas of life a majority should not control."'192 But this model
imposes upon the Court strict requirements of decisionmaking based upon
neutral principles, 193 a requirement that Bork expands far beyond the point
fixed by Professor Wechsler. 194 Whereas Wechsler asked for the neutral
applicationof principles, 195 Bork insists that such principles be neutral in
their "definition" and "derivation" as well-i.e., that they be valueneutral principles.196 Otherwise judges would be "imposing their own
values upon the rest of us." 197 Both Ely and Perry implicitly accept this
view. When Perry defines noninterpretive review as "constitutional policymaking," 198 and Ely concludes that noninterpretive review is difficult to
reconcile with democratic theory, 199 both join Bork in denying the Court's
power to make any value choices not clearly attributable to the framers.

187. J. CHOPER, supra note 15, at 135. Choper points out that a similar role reversal between
advocates of judicial restraint and judicial activism took place in the 1930's, after the rejection of
Lochnerism. Id.; cf.L. JAFFE, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAWMAKERS 85-89 (1969).

188. Ely, supra note 3, at 926 & n.50.
189. Id. at 943-49. Choper's own assessment of the Burger Court's record in human rights cases is
much less critical than Ely's. J. CHOPER, supra note 15, at 105; see infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
190. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 16.
191. Bork, supra note 9,at2.
192. Id. at2-3. "There are some things a majority should not do to us no matter how democratically it decides to do them. These are areas properly left to individual freedom, and coercion by the
majority in these aspects of life is tyranny." Id. at 3. Bork thus seems to accept the basic notion of
individual rights against the state, but he would strictly limit such rights to those specifically enumerated in the Constitution.
193. Id. at 2-3.
194. Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L.Rev. 1(1959).
195. "Wechsler. . .recognizes that the legal principle to be applied is itself never neutral because
itembodies achoice of one value rather than another." Bork,supra note 9,at2.
196. Id. at7; see Perry,supra note 130, at 712 n. 108 ("Bork is not calling for principled decision
making; he is demanding value-neutral decision making.").
197. Bork, supra note 9, at 7.
198. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 6.
199. J.ELY, supra note 6,at 4-5.
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appropriately

labeled

"neo-inter-

would confine the Court to values found in the text of the

Constitution except when broader intervention is necessary to preserve the

integrity of the political process. To minimize the counter-majoritarian
difficulty, the Justices would be limited to a rather narrow reading of the
text in search of values incorporated therein by the framers, aided and
augmented only by Carolene Products footnote four. The due process
clause would be confined to protection of fair procedures, 20' leaving
Lochner and Roe "equally illegitimate. 20 2 In order to circumscribe the
discretion of judges, to exorcise the ghost of Lochner, this view would strip
the open-ended provisions of the Constitution bare of all values save
majoritarianism. Only those values that could be identified with preserving
the democratic process would justify the Court in mbving beyond the

constitutional text.
The irony of this is that Ely, at least partly out of distrust for the Burger
Court, 203 has accepted the premises of moral skepticism advanced by that

Court's most conservative member. In seeking to confine the Court to the
constitutional text, except when a process-oriented justification exists for
noninterpretivist review, Ely seems to accept Justice Rehnquist's position
that "[b]eyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there simply is
no basis other than the individual conscience of the citizen that may serve as
a platform for the launching of moral judgments. "204 Yet it should be noted
that Justice Rehnquist's strict interpretivist views have not prevented him
from reading his own values into the tenth amendment in such cases as
NationalLeague ofCities v. Usery,20 5 even though doing so required him to
200. Alexander, supra note 10, at 9-10.
201. See J. ELY, supra note 6, at 15-21.
202. Commentary, supranote 186, at 532 ("I don't think Lochner and Roe can be distinguished. It
seems to me they are equally illegitimate uses of the Court's power.") Indeed, Ely views Roe as having
even less claim to legitimacy than Lochner. Cf Ely, supranote 3, at 940-943 (arguing that because Roe
explicitly identifies the "right to an abortion" as "fundamental" it "may turn out to be the more
dangerous precedent"). This argument, of course, is grounded in Ely's fragmented reading of Roe as
enunciating a right to abortion, rather than a right of choice as part of the autonomy protected by the
substantive due process right of privacy.
203. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
204. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693, 704 (1976). See M.
PERRY, supra note 1, at 102-07 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's moral skepticism).
205. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (recently overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Met. Transit Auth., 105 S.
Ct. 1005 (1985)). "No value judgment constitutionalized by the framers even plausibly required the
result in NationalLeague of Cities." M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 48 (concluding that noninterpretive
review alone could explain the result in National League).
In National League, Justice Rehnquist managed to revive, for a limited time and for a limited
purpose, a view of the tenth amendment as a limitation on the federal commerce power that had been
used as grounds for invalidating federal economic regulations during the Lochner era, but which had
been rejected by the Court in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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disregard, discard, or distort considerable precedent. At the very least, this
should demonstrate the futility of attempting to remove all moral values
from the Court's consideration. These values will creep in, no matter how
objective the standards are made to appear, but the "risk of an occasional
egregious error like National League of Cities is the price we pay for
20 6
treating the Constitution as law."
Perry's theory accepts, at least arguendo, the premise that noninterpretive review is constitutional policymaking, which "ought to be subject to control by persons accountable to the electorate. 20 7 But he argues
that noninterpretive review is nonetheless functionally justified, at least in
human rights cases, as the "institutionalization of prophecy, '20 8 and
rejects moral skepticism by conceding at least the possibility that there may
be right answers to political-moral questions. 20 9 Nor does he believe that
the fallibility of the Court-the possibility of false prophecy-is a sufficient reason to "reject the whole enterprise." 2 10 Instead, to ensure some
measure of political control over noninterpretive review, he would concede
that Congress has unlimited power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal

courts in noninterpretive cases. 211 This would subject most modem decisions dealing with human rights to the rarely used and much disputed

206. Gibbons, Keynote Address, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 260, 268 (1981); see also M. PERRY, supra
note 1, at 47-49 (characterizing National League of Cities as a noninterpretive opinion by the
"staunchest and most articulate defender of interpretivism" on the Court).
207. M. PERRY, supranote 1, at 9. "[M]y strategy is not to reject the principle but, on the contrary,
to accept it as a given and then to defend judicial review-in particular, constitutional policymakingas not inconsistent with the principle." Id. at 10. It is Perry's use of the word "strategy" that suggests
that his acceptance is for the sake of argument only. See also supra note 186.
208. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 98.
The basic function of [judicial review] is to deal with those political issues that are also
fundamental moral problems in a way that is faithful to the notion of moral evolution (and,
therefore, to our collective religious self-understanding)-not simply by invoking established
moral conventions but by seizing such issues as opportunities for moral reevaluation and possible
moral growth. That is the sense in which I mean that noninterpretive review in human rights cases
represents the institutionalization of prophecy. Such review is an enterprise designed to enable the
American polity to live out its commitment to an ever-deepening moral understanding and to
political practices that harmonize with that understanding.
Id. at 101. Rephrased in secular terms, Perry sees noninterpretivist review in human rights cases as
enabling us "to maintain a tolerable accommodation between, first, our democratic commitment and,
second, the possibility that there may indeed be right answers-discoverable right answers-to
fundamental political-moral problems." Id. at 102.
209. Id. at 102-07; see supra note 208.
210. Id. at 115-16. Judicial fallibility appears to be a motivating force behind Ely's theory. See
supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
211. Id. at 128-33.
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power of Congress to limit federal court jurisdiction, 2 12 even though Perry
believes that such decisions constitute "the most important constitutional
2 14
function of the Court." 213 Surely Perry concedes too much.
Professor Choper is much less concerned with the counter-majoritarian
difficulty than either Ely or Perry. He agrees that judicial review is "incompatible with a fundamental precept of American democracy-majority
rule"-because the Court is not a politically responsible institution. 215 But
our constitutional scheme is far from pure majoritarianism, 216 and in that
scheme, the Supreme Court performs a vital function: protecting against
"governmental infringement of individual liberties secured by the Constitution." 217 Furthermore, Choper argues, the Court is uniquely qualified to
218
fulfill its assigned role as the "ultimate guardian of individual liberty":
Since, almost by definition, the processes of democracy bode ill for the
security of personal rights and, as experience shows, such liberties are not
infrequently endangered by popular majorities, the task of custodianship has
been and should be assigned to a governing body that is insulated from
political responsibility and unbeholden to self-absorbed and excited majoritarianism. The Court's aloofness from the political system and the Justices'
lack of dependence for maintenance in office on the popularity of a particular
ruling promise an objectivity that elected representatives are not-and
should not be-as capable of achieving. And the more deliberative, contemplative quality of the judicial process further lends itself to dispassionate
2
decisionmaking. 19
212. See, e.g., Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
Because Perry defines interpretivism very narrowly, virtually all modem decisions dealing with
individual rights, including first amendment rights, fall within his definition of "noninterpretivist"
review. See Lupu, supra note 18 1, at 584, 601-02. Professor Gunther characterizes Perry's position as
"very unusual." Gunther, supra, at 911 n.69.
213. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 37.
214. See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 181, at 548, 601-02. Perry's efforts might have been more
productive if he had examined his "axiom" that judicial policymaking "must be electorally accountable." See supra note 186.
215. J. CHOPER, supra note 15, at 2.
216. Id. at 61 ("the Constitution consists of a mass of antimajoritarian imperatives"); see also
Perry, supra note 130, at 712-13 ("Our [national] commitment [to majoritarianism] is not, and has
never been, that clear. Moreover, it certainly has not been a commitment to a restrictive theory of the
judicial function."); Powell, Authority and Freedom in a Democratic Society: Constitution, Legislature, Courts, 44 COLuM. L. REV. 473, 487 (1944).
217. J. CHOPER, supra note 15, at 64; see also id. at 59 ("[Tlhe essential role ofjudicial review in
our society is to guard against certain constitutional transgressions which popular majorities specifically seek to impose.").
218. Id. at 67.
219. Id. at 68; cf A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 24-32.
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In Choper's view, the Supreme Court performs its vital function well
220
precisely because it is not majoritarian.
It is not democratic theory that causes Choper's concern with the
counter-majoritarian difficulty. It is rather that the Court's lack of a political base leaves it at the mercy of the political branches and dependent upon
'221
the "confidence, goodwill, and respect of the people as a whole.
Choper sees the real problem as the "ultimately fragile nature of the
judiciary's ability to effectuate its rulings. ' ' 222 In order to conserve its
limited reservoir of public acceptance, he would have the Court decline to
review certain questions of federalism and separation of powers, confining
itself to its primary function, protection of individual rights, including
privacy. 223 Choper's proposal thus poses no threat to Roe, but neither does
it purport to offer any substantive theory to justify constitutional protection
of privacy. Perry also would leave Roe untouched, but would subject it to
Congress' power to limit the Court's appellate jurisdiction. 224 Only Ely
proposes a theory of noninterpretive review that would automatically
invalidate many decisions already made, notably Roe. Indeed, the invalidation of Roe seems to be its primary goal.
It is highly unlikely, of course, that any of these proposals will actually
be adopted by the Supreme Court. In this sense, it is true that these scholars
have "talked mainly to each other.''225 Each of their proposals would
require the Court to alter its course in a radical manner, discarding wholesale entire lines of decision, or whole areas of decision, in order to resolve a
tension that is in fact built into our constitutional scheme. Even if the
recommendations offered far greater promise of ameliorating the countermajoritarian difficulty than they in fact do, following any of them would
require a recklessness that, fortunately, the Court has rarely exhibited. It
226
would mean "sabotaging the idea of continuity in constitutional law."
220. "[T]he Supreme Court is the most effective guarantor of the interests of the unpopular and
unrepresented precisely because it is the most politically isolated judicial body." J. CHoPER,supra note
15, at 69; see also M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 102; Perry, supra note 130, at 728-29.
221. J. CHOPER, supra note 15, at 138.
222. Id. at 140; see also id. at 146-61 (discussion of problems of public resistance).
223. Choper proposes that the Court (1) "abstain from deciding constitutional questions of national
power versus states' rights" and (2) "abstain from deciding ultimate issues of constitutional authority
between Congress and the President." Id. at 169. Unlike Perry, Choper does not believe that Congress'
power to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal courts is, or should be, an effective majoritarian check on
the court's counter-majoritarian power. Id. at 52-55. Choper believes that the Court should retain its
power to "pass final constitutional judgment on questions concerning the permissible reach and
circumscription of 'the judicial power.' "Id. at 382-83.
224. It is not totally clear whether this would effect a total overruling of Roe, since state courts are
not subject to the Congressional power. See Lupu, supra note 181, at 609-18.
225. Id. at 579.
226. Id. at 606; cf.Shiffrin, The FirstAmendmentandEconomicRegulation:Awayfrom a General
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This process of evolution in constitutional law-from text to authoritative, yet
bounded, decisional gloss on the text-carries the legitimacy of time, repetition, professional respect, popular understanding, and continued testing in
the adversary process. All these qualities enhance, though of course they do
not perfect or insure, the legitimacy and public acceptability of constitutional
law. 227

On the surface, the renewed concern over majoritarianism does appear to
have its own roots in constitutional jurisprudence. It seems a natural
outgrowth of the Court's own concern for equal participation in the political
228
process, demonstrated most dramatically in the apportionment cases.
Indeed, it is the preservation of the political participation values of the
Warren Court, along with its deep aversion to "Lochnerism," which
appears to motivate Ely. His theory is admirably designed to save the
Warren Court's egalitarianism from the depredations of the Burger Court,
while at the same time restricting the libertarian excursions of the Burger
Court, 229 and it seeks to accomplish this by accepting the interpretivists'
majoritarian concerns. This would be a real tour de force if Ely could pull it
off, but no one should be surprised if the Burger Court remains unpersuaded.
In reality, however, using majoritarianism as a basis for limiting the
scope of judicial review is far removed from the Warren Court's concern
with participational values. It requires a value judgment the Warren Court
never made: that majoritarianism is the dominant principle in our democratic government, overriding all other considerations, including individual rights. Ely seems willing to make that value judgment because he can
justify all of the rights that he considers most important-including first
amendment and equal protection rights-in terms of participational (majoritarian) values. But he never defends the value judgment; he simply
Theory of the FirstAmendment, 78 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1212, 1235 (1983) (commenting on the approach to
precedent of Bork and BeVier in developing a theory of the first amendment) (" [T]heir position is not
merely a claim that a particular set of precedents is wrong. That would be unremarkable. Their position
assaults the idea of precedent itself. ").
227. Lupu, supra note 181, at 606; see also id. at 616 ("The concept of erasure-a rip in the
seamless web-is destabilizing, anarchical, and wholly alien to the structure of [the Anglo-American]
system [of law.]"). The Supreme Court itself "has never indicated that it recognized any distinction
between interpretive and noninterpretive review. . . .Nor has the Court ever seen the need to discuss
the legitimacy of its actions." Sedler, supra note 16, at 110.
228. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
229. Ely sees the Warren Court as a "CaroleneProductsCourt," and the Burger Court as departing
from that perspective in favor of an approach concerned with identifying and protecting "fundamental"
values. Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92
HARV. L. REV. 5, 12 (1978). Similarly, Lupu sees the fourteenth amendment as embodying the ideals of
liberty (due process) and equality (equal protection), and the Burger Court as moving away from the
egalitarian concerns of the Warren Court towards greater concerns for libertarian values. Lupu, supra
note 78, at 982-84.
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announces it in conclusory terms: "[M]ajoritarian democracy is. . .the
core of our entire system."230 Once that pronouncement is made, he need
speak only of process. But is majoritarianism really an end in itself, or only
a means to an end? Are not the true ends of our system of government those
described in the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence-life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness-and majoritarianism merely a means
to those ends? 231
The Constitutional theory on which our government rests is not a simple
majoritarian theory. The Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, is
designed to protect individual citizens and groups against certain decisions
that a majority of citizens might want to make, even when that majority acts in
what it takes to be the general or common interesft 3 2
Protection of individual rights against the majority cannot be left to the
majoritarian political processes. 233 Therefore, our Constitution and Bill of
Rights limit the power of government to restrict the liberty of the individual.
Ely is decidedly ambivalent about liberty. He dismisses the Declaration
of Independence as a "brief," 234 although it is not clear why that characterization requires that it be disregarded as a source of values. Elsewhere,
however, Ely concedes that liberty is one of the central purposes of our
constitutional system: "[O]ur Constitution has always been substantially
230. J. Ely, supra note 6, at 7.
Estreicher accuses Ely of employing the same methodology he condemns in Lochner and Roe"inferring a preferred set of values from wholly open-ended provisions" of the Constitution. Estreicher, supra note 55, at 551; see id. at 565 ("Ely's 'participational values' themselves embody
substantive choices"); cf Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 502-10 (1981)
(discussing Ely's attempts to justify protection of freedom of speech in process terms); see also Brest,
supranote 55, at 140 ("The representation-reinforcing enterprise is shot full ofvalue choices ..
");
Glennon, PersonalAutonomy in Democracy and Distrust, 1CoNsr. CoM. 229,229 (1984); Grano, Ely's
Theory ofJudicialReview: Preservingthe Significanceof the PoliticalProcess,42 OHIO ST. L.J. 167,
181 (1981); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-BaiedConstitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063, 1067 (1980). Other substantive values buried in Ely's discussion of process are identified in
Richards, The Aims of ConstitutionalTheory, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 723, 740 (1983) (utilitarianism),
and Richards, supra note 186, at 330-31 (moral universalization or reciprocity).
231. See, e.g., Benedict, To Secure These Rights: Rights, Democracy andJudicialReview in the
Anglo-American Constitutional Heritage, 42 OHto ST. L.J. 69, 85 (1981) ("both representative
democracy and judicial review developed as means to secure a greater end-protection of rights");
Rostow, The Supreme Courtand the People's Will, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 573,577 (1958) ("The object
of the men who established the American Constitution. . .was not omnicompetent popular government, but the freedom of man as an individual being within a free society whose policies are based
ultimately upon his consenting will."); cf Sedler, supra note 16, at 124 ("The overriding principle in
the structure of constitutional governance. . . is not the principle of representative democracy, but the
principle of limitation on governmental power.").
232. R. Dwomm, TAKinO RiGm'S SERIOUSLY 132-33 (1977).
233. See id. at 142 ("decisions about rights agalnst the majority are not issues that in fairness ought
to be left to the majority").
234. J. ELY, supra note 6, at 49.
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concerned with preserving liberty. If it weren't, it would hardly be worth
fighting for." 235 He insists, nevertheless, that the Constitution is concerned
primarily with process, rather than "ideology. ,236 But "ideology" is not
what is meant when we speak of ends. What we mean are ideals, and if Ely
were successful in stripping the Constitution bare of all ideals, it would
indeed "hardly be worth fighting for." But of course Ely does not really
want to excise all ideals from the Constitution. All he wants is to excise the
word "liberty" from the due process clauses, or at least to confine it to
freedom from physical restraint (i.e., to procedural matters). 237 Judges
simply cannot be trusted to deal with broad concepts such as liberty. They
might identify the "wrong" liberty, as they did in Lochner, and so frustrate
the will of the majority. To guard against this danger, Ely is willing to deny
any substantive content to fourteenth amendment lib&rty, as was Justice
Black.
The interpretivist Justice Black could accept the total incorporation of
the Bill of Rights into the due process clause because when substantive due
process is used as a conduit for applying the first amendment, or other Bill
of Rights provisions, to the states, the judges' discretion is limited, to some
extent at least, by the terms of the amendment being applied. 238 But beyond
incorporation, he thought the Court had no "broad, unlimited power to hold
laws unconstitutional because they offend what this Court conceives to be
the '[collective] conscience of our people.' '"239 Black's targets in this
broadside were Cardozo's concept of ordered liberty, 240 Harlan's tradition, 241 and Frankfurter's consensus, 242 all subsumed under the heading
"natural justice. ' 243 His prime target, of course, was Lochner and its
235. Id. at 100; see also id. at 93 ("the very point of all that had been wrought [in the Constitution]
had been, in large measure, to preserve the liberties of individuals").
236. Id. at 101.
237. See id. at 14-21. Other constitutional ideals, such as the right to equal treatment embodied in
the equal protection clause, can be fitted within his process-oriented theory. Even the thirteenth
amendment, Ely says, "can be forced into a 'process' mold," but it (alone among the Reconstruction
amendments) does embody a substantive value, rejection of human slavery. Id. at 98.
238. But see, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 194, at 17 (suggesting that the specific constitutional
provisions really are not all that specific).
239. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black was
not always consistent in his interpretivist position. See R. BERGER, supra note 9, at 262-64.
240. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
241. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
242. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 471 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("the consensus of society's opinion which, for purposes of due process, is the standard
enjoined by the Constitution").
243. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,511 n.4 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) ("A collection
of the catchwords and catch phrases invoked by judges who would strike down under the Fourteenth
Amendment laws which offend their notions of natural justice would fill many pages.").
In 1965, when this was written, Justice Black may already have been beating a dead horse (although
Black may claim considerable credit for preventing its resurrection). The concept of natural law now has
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"natural law due process philosophy," ' 244 which he saw revived in
Griswold. For Black, natural law meant judges deciding "what is or is not
constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or
unnecessary"245-in other words, judicial legislation, as in Lochner.
Black's aversion to substantive due process has been accepted as the basic
premise underlying the theories of both Ely and Perry.
Perry follows Justice Black's view when he defines noninterpretive
review as "judicial policymaking. 246 The Court strikes down "a policy
choice made by an electorally accountable branch of government-in Roe,
for example, a state legislature-and supplant[s] it with a policy choice of
its own.", 247 Perry pronounces this undemocratic, based on a definition of
democracy that is "primarily procedural, not substantive"-that is, a
definition from which he has excised all values, "such as substantive
equality, respect for human rights, concern for the general welfare, personal liberty or the rule of law. "248 To say that noninterpretive review is
undemocratic in this limited sense is to say only that the Court is not
electorally accountable. It is the values so carefully excised from the word
"democracy" that make it, to borrow Ely's phrase, "worth fighting for." 249
It is these values, particularly personal liberty, that Justice Harlan sought
to express in his Poe v. Ullman dissent through his concept of a living
tradition. 250 To Harlan, substantive due process represented "the balance
which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society. "251 To him, this is not a process in which "judges have felt free to

"all but disappeared in American discourse." J.ELY, supra note 6, at 52; see Grey, Do We Have an
UnwrittenConstitution?, 27 STAN. L.REv.703,717 (1975) (discussing the similarities and differences
between modem human rights decisions and natural law), quoted infra note 272.
244. Grisivold, 381 U.S. at515 (Black,J.,dissenting).
245. ld. at512.
246. M. PERRY, supranote 1, at4.
247. Id. at1.
248. Id. at3 (quoting Barry, Is Democracy Special?, in PHILosoPHY, POLMcs AND SOCIMTY
155-56 (5th series) (P. Laslett & J.Fishkin eds. 1979)). To avoid suggesting such "vague substantive
ideals," Perry uses the word "democracy" only sparingly, using instead "electorally accountable
policymaking." Id. at 4. Ely also excises ideals from the Constitution, insisting that the Constitution's
main concern is process, not "ideology." J. ELY, supranote 6, at 101.
249. J. ELY,supranote 6, at 100; see also id. at93 ("the very point [of setting up a democratic
structure was] to preserve the liberties
of individuals").
250. 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is also embodied in Brandeis' concept of
a "right to be let alone," which Harlan builds upon. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting).
251. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan,J.,
dissenting). The idea of "balancing" expressed by Harlan
was anathema to the interpretivist absolutist, Justice Black.
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roam where unguided speculation might take them." ' 252 Each constitutional claim "must be considered against a background of Constitutional
purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and historically developed. 253 This is a rational process, in which, as Dworkin says, "the
judge tries to reach an accommodation between . . . precedents and a set
of principles that might justify them and also justify further decisions that
254
go beyond them."
Perry questions whether, "beyond rhetoric, there even are any traditional
or consensual values-'public values'-sufficiently determinate to be of
use to the Court in resolving particular human rights conflicts. ' 255 Ely
rejects both reason and tradition as sources of values. 256 Reason is rather a
method than a source of values, so perhaps Ely is correct in calling it an
"empty source," but he also argues that it is "flagrantly elitist and undemocratic. ' 257 Upper-middle-class judges are too likely to find uppermiddle-class values, such as the privacy of the home or personal autonomy,
fundamental, as opposed to "jobs, food, or housing. 258 But jobs, food,
and housing represent entitlements from the state rather than rights against
the state (i.e., limitations on the state's power to control individual
choices). 259 Even if it were true that the poor are more concerned with such
entitlements than with rights against the government, and even if the Court
were wrong in its failure to recognize entitlements as constitutionally
enforceable, this would not prove that the Court is also wrong with regard to
the protection accorded human rights. 260 Whatever their priorities, the poor
do have an interest in rights against the state, as well as in entitlements from
the state. Right or wrong, it is the concept of rights against the state, rather
than entitlements from the state, that is written into our Constitution and
26 1
our tradition.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 544.
254. R. DWORKIN, supra note 232, at 161. This is what Dworkin describes as the "constructive"
model of judicial decisionmaking (as opposed to the "natural" model, in which "[tlheories ofjustice
• . . describe an objective moral reality. ") Id. at 160. The constructive model "demands that we act on
principle rather than on faith." Id. at 162. Dworkin considers the Warren-Brandeis privacy article the
paradigmatic example of "argument in the constructive mode." Id. at 160.
255. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 96. Although Perry ultimately rejects moral skepticism, id. at
102-07, he asserts that the question quoted in the text "increasingly is answered in the negative." Id. at
96.
256. J. ELY, supra note 6, at 56-63.
257. Id. at 59.
258. Id.
259. Cf L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 919-21.
260. Cf id., § 11.4, at 573-75. The concepts of liberty and equality embodied in the Constitution
may be in tension at times, but they are hardly irreconcilable.
261. Thus the Bill of Rights contains prohibitions against government action, such as "Congress
shall make no law ... ," U.S. CONST. amend. I, rather than provisions mandating government
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Ely's argument against tradition is not that there is no such thing, but
rather that there are too many traditions from which to choose; thus
tradition "can be invoked in support of almost any cause." '262 As an
example, he cites two "conflicting traditions" with regard to racial discrimination: "the egalitarian one to which most official documents have paid lip
service over the past century, and the quite different and malevolent one
that in fact has characterized much official and unofficial practice over the
same period (and certainly before)." 263 This example does not really
describe two traditions at all-at least not if tradition refers to national
ideals, the sense in which Harlan used it. What it describes is the dichotomy between idealistic theory and official practice, 264 and the fact that we
often have had difficulty in living up to our ideals hardly justifies giving up
265
the effort:
action. "The Constitution tells government not what it must do, but what it must not do. The Framers
saw the purposes of government as being to police and safeguard, not to feed and clothe and house."
Henkin, ConstitutionalRights and Human Rights, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 593, 618 (1978).
Although the argument that the Constitution should be read as mandating some entitlements is not
untenable, it hardly requires rejection of the concept of individual rights against the state.
262. L ELY, supra note 6, at 60.
263. Id. at 61.
One is tempted to answer Ely's statement with a question: Can there be any doubt as to which
tradition is the relevant one? See Alexander Bickel's answer infra text accompanying note 266. But
Professor Berger seems to say, in his extended discussion of "Negrophobia" in the post-civil war
period, that, in fact, it is the "malevolent" tradition that is relevant. See R. BERGER, supra note 9, at
10-19. In Berger's view, "The key to an understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is that the North
was shot through with Negrophobia, that the Republicans, except for a minority of extremists, were
swayed by the racism that gripped their constituents rather than by abolitionist ideology." Id. at 10. Is
one to conclude from this that the fourteenth amendment must forever be given a racist interpretation?
Perry expresses a thought similar to Ely's:
The fact of the matter, our idealized Fourth of July oratory to the contrary notwithstanding, is that
the so-called American tradition, to the extent it is determinate or concrete at all, is severely
fragmented; there are several American traditions, and they include denial of freedom of expression, racial intolerance, and religious bigotry.
M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 93. The point is that, to the extent that "Fourth of July oratory" represents
America's idealization of itself and its goals, the effort should be directed toward making its institutions
and its law conform to those ideals and goals. We should not allow ourselves the luxury of speaking out
of both sides of our mouths.
264. Cf.R. COvER, JusTicE AccusED 20-22 (1975) (discussing the disparity between revolutionary
rhetoric and the institution of slavery in the revolutionary period). Cover points out that, in the
revolutionary period, many "were aware that the plea for independence sounded hollow in the mouths
of slaveholders." Id. at 21.
The concept that "all men are created equal" represented an ideal that was farfrom realization in
1776. Even when the concept was particularized in the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments, it was still
many years before it was to be effectively implemented, and indeed the ideal still is not fully realized
today. But the fact that the existence of slavery and the general level of society in 1776 mocked the
expression of that ideal in the Declaration of Independence does not detract from its validity as an ideal,
or require that it be interpreted today as limited by the inadequacies of the society that existed in 1776.
265. Cf.Saphire, The Searchfor Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What Price Purity?, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 381 (1981) ("It seems to me that we have begun to confuse the intractability and
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We are guided in our search of the past by our own aspirations and evolving
principles, which were in part formed by that very past. When we find in
history, immanent or expressed, principles that we can adopt or adapt, or
ideals and aspirations that speak with contemporary relevance, we find at the
same time evidence of inconsistent conduct. But we reason from the former,
not from the frailties of men who, like ourselves, did not always live up to all
they professed or aspired to. Lincoln reasoned, not from the Framers' resignation to the fact of slavery, but from the abolition of the slave trade and from the
numerous manumissions, particularly in Virginia. In considering the Bill of
Rights, we find worthy of note the stirrings of libertarian theory in colonial
times, not the barbaric prosecutions.266

Aspirations and principles, not prejudices, are the traditions that we must
look to. The Court's task is no less than to "translate into concrete form our
267
deepest, most abstract public values."
Ely asks us to reject what is best in our national heritage. He urges upon
us a valueless jurisprudence, and valueless institutions, Professor Bickel
reminded us, are "shameful and shameless. ' 268 Bickel's Constitution
recognized "that principles are necessary, have evolved, and should continue to evolve in the light of history and changing circumstances. ,269 What
we are being asked to give up, as insurance against a resurgence of
Lochnerism, is the whole concept of a Constitution that protects individual
rights against the government, a concept that has animated our best legal
270
minds and captured the imagination of other peoples as well as our own.
elusiveness of moral judgments with the very possibility and desirability of making them.").
266. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 109-10.
267. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 745. 799
(1983).
To the "skeptical observation by Robert Bork," which Perry leaves unanswered-"What kind of
'fundamental presupposition of our society' is it that cannot command a legislative majority?"--the
answer is: almost any one that might antagonize a sizeable group of organized and vocal electors. See
M. PERRY. supra note 1,at 93-94 (quoting Bork, The Legacy ofAlexanderM. Bickel, YALE L. REP. 6.9
(Fall 1979)).
268. A. BICKEL, supranote 12, at 24 ("A valueless politics and valueless institutions are shameful
and shameless and, what is more, man's nature is such that he finds them, and life with and under them.
insupportable.").
269. Id. at 25. Ultimately, Bickel found the highest values, as Ely later did, in the "constitution of
structure and process." Id. at 29. "[T]he contractarian liberal is a moralist, and the moralist will find it
difficult to sacrifice his aims in favor of structure and process, to sacrifice substance for form. Yet
process and form, which is the embodiment of process, are the essence of the theory and practice of
constitutionalism." Id. at 30; see also id. at 123 ("the highest morality almost always is the morality of
process").
Bickel's resort to the "constitution of structure and process" follows discussion of Roe v. Wade, in
which he accused the court of "refus[ing] the discipline to which its function is properly subject." i.e.,
of failing to explain the reasoning behind its decision. Id. at 27-28. Thus with Bickel, as with Ely, the
flight to process was inspired by Roe.
270. The American concept of rights against government was a "major inspiration and model" for
the creation of international human rights. "As a result, most of the Universal Declaration of Human
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It is a concept that found elegant expression in Brandeis' Olmstead dissent:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
271
civilized men.

272
Whether or not Brandeis' vision truly reflected the vision of the framers,
273
it does reflect our best vision of ourselves and our system of government.
Perhaps if all judges were Brandeises, or Holmeses, or Cardozos, Ely
would be willing to risk allowing them to deal with volatile concepts such
as liberty. But we may as well recognize that great judges are a rarity-in
the past two hundred years only a handful have emerged. We must take our
chances with the unexceptional variety that our political processes ordinarily provide. We must risk that in the future, as in the past, "[t]he Court
may mistake what is fundamental and enduring, as we now think it mistook
the importance of 'liberty of contract,' but where it errs, its judgments will
surely yield, as they yielded in that instance, to the slow pressures of
unfolding history. '274 No constitutional theory can be devised that can
safeguard us completely from judicial error, so it is futile to withhold
discretion from judges on the chance they might misuse it. It is better to
have a "constitutional jurisprudence that assumes and demands [the
judges'] best than one that expects their worst." 275
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is, in essence, American constitutional rights projected around the world." Henkin, supra note 261, at 609.
271. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
272. Cf. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 99-100 (discussing a similar attribution of intent to the
framers in Brandeis' Whitney concurrence).
The intellectual framework against which these rights [the right to vote, the right of privacy,
etc.] have developed is different from the natural-rights tradition of the founding fathers-its
rhetorical reference points are the Anglo-American tradition and basic American ideals, rather
than human nature, the social contract, or the rights of man. But it is the modem offspring, in a
direct and traceable line of legitimate descent, of the natural-rights tradition that is so deeply
embedded in our constitutional origins.
Grey, supra note 243, at 717.
273. Perry seeks to capture this self-vision in his concept of prophecy, our "religious selfunderstanding." M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 97-99.
With nations, as with individuals, one of the tests of maturity is how closely one's self-perception
squares with reality, or with the way one is perceived by others. Unless we are prepared to reject the
ideals embodied in Brandeis' vision and alter our self-image to fit reality, we must find some way of
squaring reality with our self-image-i.e., we must at least continue the attempt to live up to our ideals.
274. Cox, The Role of Congressin ConstitutionalDetermninations,40 U. CN. L. REv. 199,220-21
(1971).
275. Lupu, supra note 78, at 1054.
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By Choper's gentler assessment, the Burger Court has not been wholly
regressive in its handling of human rights issues. 276 Despite some retrenchments, its record falls far short of total surrender. 277 Future ideologically
motivated appointments may change this, but whatever hazards the future
may hold, they are unlikely to arise from the Court's protection of personal
privacy and autonomy. 278 The similarities between Lochner and Roe have
been exaggerated, at least in part because of the way the Court itself has
characterized its decisionmaking process as a search for fundamental
values entitled to special protection under the Constitution. This characterization was adopted largely to avoid acknowledging that what the Court has
really been doing is balancing, because balancing was misused in Lochner.
But describing itself as choosing fundamental values invites the kind of
criticism that has been heaped upon the Court. It is easy to argue that value
choices are for legislatures. Furthermore, identifying certain constitutional
values as fundamental-even if the process is less arbitrary than the critics
charge-hardly suffices to describe a decisionmaking process that in
reality is, or should be, far more complex. It is only by looking at the entire
process-at both sides of the balance, in their different factual contextsthat we can hope to find the relevant differences between Roe and Lochner.
No member of the Court has appreciated the significance of factual
contexts more than Justice Brandeis. Recall that long ago he advocated
both protection of family autonomy and abolition of Lochner. It should
prove useful to attempt, at least, to look at the problem through the eyes of
279
Brandeis.
V.

THE LEGACY OF BRANDEIS
Our Constitution is not a strait-jacket. It is a living organism. As such it is
capable of growth-of expansion and of adaptation to new conditions.
Growth implies changes, political, economic and social. Growth which is
significant manifests itself rather in intellectual and moral conceptions than in

276. J. CHOPER, supra note 15, at 105.
277. Id. at 104-05. Choper believes the Court's "most prominent advance" was its development of
the right of privacy, id. at 107, a view that Ely is unlikely to share.
278. For one thing, the Court has shown little inclination to expand the constitutional right of
privacy; indeed, there are signs of retrenchment in the abortion funding cases and elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983), Justice O'Connor wrote a dissent joined by the two Roe v. Wade dissenters, White and
Rehnquist, that urged substantial revision of the Roe v. Wade analysis to give more deference to state
regulation of abortion.
279. Woodrow Wilson once said that a "talk with Brandeis always sweeps the cobwebs out of one's
mind." A. MASON, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAN'S LIFE 582 (1946).

Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review
material things. Because our Constitution possesses the capacity of adapta280
tion, it has endured as the fundamental law of an ever-developing people.

Under Ely's definition, Brandeis' concept of a living Constitution would
label him a noninterpretivist. Yet Brandeis is remembered, not as a judge
who "felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take [him],"281
but rather as an advocate of judicial self-restraint. 282 He was concerned that
the justices not "erect our prejudices into legal principles, 283 but this did
not prevent him from speaking boldly for individual rights against the state.
It was clear to him that protecting the individual against state power did not
pose the same threat to democracy as interfering with legislative solutions
to social and economic problems; that, indeed, the greater threat would
come from not protecting individual rights. His distinctive contribution to
our law was that "with immense resourcefulness he found ways to build the
ancient ideals we profess into the structure of twentieth-century Amer284
ica."
The political ideals that have become stereotypes for most Americans
retained for Brandeis "their original meaning and warmth, '' 285 perhaps
because he was born in this country to recent immigrants and grew up in an
atmosphere of "what might be called primitive Americanism. ' 286 The
failed revolutions of 1848, which precipitated his parents' departure from
Bohemia, "represented a renewal on Continental soil of the equalitarian
ideals of the American and French revolutions. 287 Transplanted back to
280. A. BICKEL, supra note 11, at 107-08 (quoting a paragraph dropped from a Brandeis dissent at
the request of Chief Justice Taft, who considered it "unnecessary" and "certain to be used to support
views that I could not subscribe to").
281. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
282. The Brandeis concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936), is a classic
exposition of the principles of self-restraint that Brandeis felt should guide the Court. See Mendleson,
The Influence of JamesB. Thayer Upon The Work ofHolmes, Brandeis,and Frankfurter,31 VAND. L.
REV. 71, 78 (1978).
283. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
284. P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JuSTIcE 145 (1968); see also Bryden, Brandeis'sFacts, 1 CONST.
COM. 281, 281-82 (1984):
For reformist lawyers, Louis Brandeis remains the consummate professional-a unique blend
of the almost incompatible qualities that we most admire: prodigiously industrious but "a free
man"; fabulously learned about business as well as law; a righteous preacher with an engineer's
grasp of minutia; fiercely hostile to the trusts, yet always constructive; a man who recast themes
from classical liberalism-individual responsibility, the sense of craftsmanship, village democracy-into a vision of industrial America that even now seems both daring and conservative. He
has acquired some of the patina of an ancient statesman, yet many of his problems-from privacy
to freedom of speech to unemployment-are our problems, and many of his answers still inspire.
He was a founding father of the twentieth-century Constitution.
285. M. LERNER, IDEAS ARE WEAPONS: THE HISTORY AND USES OF IDEAS 99 (1940).
286. Id. at 73.
287. Id. Lerner describes the 1848 revolutions, "aptly characterized by Trevelyan as 'the turning-
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American soil, these ideals "imparted a new freshness and vigor to the
American tradition of civil and political liberties. 288 This background
gave Brandeis a strong sense of individualism, later tempered by an equally
289
strong sense of social justice.
Brandeis' understanding of our democracy went far beyond simple
majoritarianism to the values underlying our democratic system of government. In a speech made shortly before he was elevated to the Supreme
Court in 1916, he said that democracy "insists that the full development of
each individual is not only a right, but a duty to society; and that our best
290
hope for civilization lies not in uniformity, but in wise differentiation.
But the equal right of all individuals to development required a limitation:
"Each man may develop himself so far, but only so far, as his doing so will
not interfere with the exercise

.

.

.

of a like right by every other of our

fellow-citizens." ' 291 Although Brandeis always insisted that he had "no
general philosophy," 292 his "limitation" has echoes of Mill's principle:
"That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others.", 293 To Brandeis, no less than to Mill, government power over the
individual was limited by the individual's rights of autonomy, which he
identified as the right of self-development.29 4 Nevertheless, Brandeis was
no nineteenth-century libertarian; his individualism was tempered by a
profound understanding of the social changes wrought by the industrial
295
revolution.
point at which modern history failed to turn' [as] in spirit constitutional, humanitarian, idealistic." Id.
288. Id. ("Freedom and justice and democracy as home-grown varieties had wilted a bit in the hot
climate of American experience; but when similar doctrines were transplanted from Europe they
became vigorous and even beautiful growths."); see also Hamilton, The Jurist'sArt, 31 COLUM. L.
REv. 1073, 1090 (1931) ("His [Brandeis'] parents, natives of Prague, were members of a band of
'Pilgrims of '48'; the failure of revolution in Europe led them to emigrate to America. They brought
with them democratic notions and grand pianos, hard sense in their heads and verses from the romantic
poets upon their lips.").
289. M. LERNER, supra note 285, at 73-75.
290.

J. DEHAAS, Louis D. BRANDEIS: A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 221 (1929) (quoting Brandeis'

address to a mass meeting held in New York on January 24, 1916, to arouse public interest in the Jewish
Congress movement).
291. Id. at 220.
292.

A. LIEF, THE BRANDEIS GUIDE TO THE MODERN WORLD 209 (1941)

("I have no general

philosophy. All my life I have thought only in connection with the facts that came before me."). see
also, e.g., M. LERNER, supra note 285, at 71.
293. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Pelican Books ed. New York 1980) (1st ed. 1859).
294. "The ideal is for the people to have as little need of government and the law as possible. We
need government to give help, but it should be restricted to certain limits." A. LIEF, supra note 292, at
35 (reporting a conversation of the author with Brandeis, April 18, 1937).
295. See M. LERNER, supra note 285, at 102. Brandeis did not "cleave to the tradition that the
whole duty of a Supreme Court justice was to maintain a decent ignorance of the world outside the
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In light of Brandeis' concern for individual autonomy, it is not surprising
that, when Warren and Brandeis wrote their famous article advocating
recognition of a tort remedy for invasions of privacy, they extracted from
common law sources a right of "inviolate personality, '2 96 a right far
broader and more basic than the remedy proposed. 297 The same basic right,
the "general right of the individual to be let alone, ' 298 was invoked in
Brandeis' dissent in the wiretapping case, Olmstead v. United States, 299 in
support of a constitutional right of privacy under the fourth amendment,
which he described as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.'"300 The connection between the tort and
constitutional rights was not lost on Justice Holmes, whose handwritten
note on an early draft of Brandeis' Olmstead dissent commented: "I fear
that your early. . . zeal for privacy carries you too far. "301 But the right to

Court." Id. at 82. Indeed, Mill himself,
though he supported laissez faire as a matter of policy, believed that market transactions fell
outside the protection of his principle of liberty. As he said, "Trade is a social act. Whoever
undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public does what affects the interests of other
persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction
of society."
T. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALrry 20 (1983).
296. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 205 (1890).
297. Richards, SexualAutonomy and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy:A CaseStudy in Human
Rights andthe UnwrittenConstitution,30 HASTINGs L.J. 957,972-73 (1979) ("[Blasing their argument
on the rights 'of an inviolate personality,' they spoke more broadly of the human need for 'some retreat
from the world,' of the effect of unwarranted intrusion on a person's 'estimate of himself and upon his
feelings,' and of the 'general right ofthe individual to be let alone."'); see alsoBloustein, supra note 19,
at 976; Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233 (1977).
298. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 296, at 205. The phrase, "right to be let alone," is from T.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ToTs 29 (2d ed. 1888); see McKay, The Right of Privacy:
Emanationsand Imitations, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 259, 260 (1965).
299. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). The connection between the privacy article and the Olmstead
dissent is discussed in Freund, Mr.JusticeBrandeis, in MR. JUsTICE 116-17 (A. Dunham & P. Kurland
eds. 1956). See also Gerety, supra note 297, at 233 & n.3; Peck, supra note 17, at 901-02.
300. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("They [the 'makers of our Constitution'] conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men."). See supra note 297.
The parallelism between the privacy article and the Olmstead dissent is so close as to suggest
strongly that Brandeis believed, at the time he wrote his dissent, that the fourth amendment was
intended to protect the very principle of "inviolate personality" which he had earlier suggested
was the principle underlying the common law right to privacy.
Bloustein, supra note 19, at 976-77.
301. Brandeis Harvard Papers, supra note 43, at Box 48, file 5.In response to the draft sent to him
on February 23, 1928, marked, "This is only for you," Holmes wrote:
I think this is a [fine) discourse. I agree with the last point [illegal government activity].
I still wobble on illegal search and regretfully but categorically disagree with the notion that the

Washington Law Review

Vol. 61:293, 1986

be let alone expressed much more than a zeal for privacy in the dictionary
sense of secrecy and seclusion. 30 2 It expressed Brandeis' fundamental
conception of the blessings of liberty secured by our form of constitutional
democracy: the right of the individual to self-development without undue
interference either by other individuals or by government. 3°3 It was this
broader view of privacy that the present Court implicitly adopted when it
held the right of privacy to be broad enough to encompass a woman's
3°4
decision whether or not to have a child.
It is not at all clear that Brandeis himself would have approved application of his right of self-development to contraception and abortion, although he may have approved, in principle, the formulation of a constitutional right of privacy and autonomy. 30 5 He may also have approved
use of the knowledge gained by wiretapping is contra Am. V.
I fear that your early [started] zeal for privacy carries you too far.
OWH
Id. In response to the final draft, "OWH" reiterated his agreement on "the last ground," but said he was
"not quite ready to accept the Constitutional one." Id. Justice Stone, on the other hand, wrote, "Iam
with you on the Constitutional point . . . .I have some doubts about your second ground but will let
you know." Id. at file 6.
Ultimately, with encouragement from Brandeis, see 2 HOLMES-POLLACK LErTrRS 222 (Howe ed.
1941), Holmes wrote a separate dissent, relying on the nonconstitutional ground that "government
ought not to use evidence obtained and only obtainable by a criminal act." Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470
("[F]or my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part."). Stone concurred in both the Holmes and Brandeis dissents. Id. at 488.
302. See supra note 146.
303. See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text. Professor Richards sees the arguments of the
privacy article and the Olnsteaddissent as expressing "the ultimate moral vision of human rights-that
there are intrinsic limits on the power of individuals and the state to violate basic interests of the
person." Richards, supra note 297, at 1016. Richards sees Brandeis as invoking the "general conception of human rights, founded on autonomy and equal concern and respect." Id. at 974.
304. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy.., is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."). But see McKay, supra
note 298, at 278 (finding "little resemblance" between the Griswold right and fourth amendment
privacy).
305. Interview with Paul A. Freund, in Cambridge, Mass. (Sept. 18, 1981). Professor Freund, a
former Brandeis law clerk, speculated that Brandeis would have treated privacy "as a problem in the
meaning of the liberty [under] the fourteenth amendment," (i.e., as a substantive due process right) to
be weighed against the societal interest in regulation, rather than as a distinct constitutional right.
Another former clerk, Judge Henry J. Friendly, believed that Brandeis might have approved constitutional protection of privacy in principle, but that he would not have agreed with Roe, especially the
trimester analysis, which he would have found too mechanical. Interview with Henry J. Friendly. in
New York City (Dec. 16, 1981). A similar question is posed in McKay, supra note 298, at 260:
One wonders what Mr. Brandeis, as he was in 1890, or Mr. Justice Brandeis, as he was from
1916 to 1939, would have thought of these developments [enunciation of the constitutional right to
privacy in Griswold]. Whatever may have been his original view of the matter, certainly Brandeis
came ultimately to regard the right of privacy as a concept with more than one facet; one may
speculate that he may have recognized that it was capable of still further growth . ...
The doubts as to Brandeis' approval of the applications of the right of privacy to contraception and
abortion derive largely from the considerable puritan strain in Brandeis' character, a trait that the former
law clerks interviewed recognized. Brandeis himself acknowledged it, at least by implication. When
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extension of the right of privacy to accumulations of personal data in
computer memory banks, an extension that the Court approved in principle
in Whalen v. Roe. 30 6 Here the interest being protected (nondisclosure of
private information) is identical to that protected by both the tort right and
the fourth amendment right, bringing the constitutional right of privacy full
circle to its origins in the Warren-Brandeis article. Indeed, the threat to
privacy posed by advancing technology was foreseen by Justice Brandeis at
the time he wrote the Olmstead dissent. An early draft of his dissent
contained this prophecy:
The advances in science-discovery and invention-have made it possible
for the Government to effect disclosure in court of "what is whispered in the
closet"-by means far more effective than stretching the defendant upon the
rack. By means of television, radium and photography, there may some day
Felix Frankfurter suggested to Brandeis that Holmes was "more puritan than you," Brandeis did not
deny it, but replied "vehemently" that Holmes was "more so, much more so." Felix Frankfurter notes
of conversations with Brandeis, Brandeis Harvard Papers, supra note 43, at Box 114, file 14.
In order to project Brandeis' methods onto today's privacy issues it is necessary to separate his mode
of analysis, which is timeless, from his views on sexual morality, which were shaped in the heavily
Victorian atmosphere of nineteenth-century Louisville and Boston. It is highly unlikely that Brandeis
himself ever considered the possibility of applying his privacy concept to contraception or abortion.
Even the contraception involved in Grisivold was "little recognized" in the polite society Warren and
Brandeis had sought to protect in their ground-breaking article. McKay, supra note 298.
McKay suggests that Brandeis' reaction to constitutionalizing privacy might have been different for
the early Brandeis, of 1890 or 1916, than for the Brandeis of 1939. Several of his former law clerks noted
a certain hardening of Brandeis' ideas, a lessening of flexibility, in his later years on the Court. One of
them speculated that, if the Brandeis of 1914 were "dropped into today, he would start from the same
premises, but probably come out quite differently, at least in a degree, than he came out then."
Interview with W. Graham Claytor, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 3, 1981).
Another cause of doubt concerning Brandeis' reaction to the privacy cases is his well-known
advocacy of judicial restraint. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,346-48 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring). Another former law clerk believed, however, that Brandeis was not so "philosophically
naive" as to deny the Court's policy-making function. But "at the same time, he obviously felt, I think,
that this law-making role was a rather philosophically precarious one in a society of representative
government." Interview with L Willard Hurst, in Madison, Wis. (Oct. 28, 1981). This led to his belief
that the Court's policy-making should be limited, and "that the Court should be very careful not to
exercise its purely personal value judgments. It should try to be relatively impersonal, as far as that's
possible, in making policy choices." Id.
It may also be relevant that Brandeis' views onjudicial restraint developed against the backdrop ofthe
Court's constitutionalization of laissez-faire in the Lochnerline of cases. Once the goal of disentangling
the Court from the legislative function of economic regulation was attained, he may not have felt the.
need to continue giving deference to legislative decisions in areas implicating the individual's right to
self-development. Indeed, he was able to make this distinction while Lochnerstill lived. See supranote
47 and accompanying text.
306. 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (state computer records of patients obtaining prescriptions for legal
drugs). Although the Court rejected the privacy attack on the New York computer storage scheme
involved, it recognized that the right of privacy could protect the "individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters" (citing, e.g., the Brandeis Olmstead dissent), as well as the interest in
"independence in making certain kinds of important decisions" involved in Roe v. Wade. Id. at
599-600.
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be developed ways by which the Government could, without removing papers
from secret drawers, reproduce them in court and lay before the jury the most
intimate occurrences of the home . .. Can it be that the constitution affords
30 7
no protection against such invasion by the Government of personal liberty?

This language was substantially modified in the final opinion, largely
because Brandeis' law clerk expressed skepticism about the potential use of
television for purposes of espionage. 308 Private information stored in computers certainly fits within the spirit of Brandeis' expressed concern about
the threat to privacy posed by technology.309
Brandeis' advocacy of both tort and constitutional protection of privacy
was part of his overall concern about the "curse of bigness. ,3 10 Throughout
most of his adult life, beginning long before he was appointed to the Court,
Brandeis fought what has turned out to be a losing battle against bigness. 3 1'
307. Freund, supra note 299, at 116. The quoted passage, "what is whispered in the closet,"
referred back to a parallel passage in the Warren-Brandeis article, supra note 296, at 205, quoted in
Freund, supra note 299, at 116:
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for
the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right
"to be let alone." Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred
precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the
prediction that "what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."
Note the use of the words "sacred precincts," later applied to the marital bedroom in Douglas' Griswold
opinion. 381 U.S. at 485.
308. Freund, supra note 299, at 117-18; Interview with Henry J. Friendly, in New York City (Dec.
16, 1981). The final language of the opinion was as follows:
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by means far more
effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the
closet.
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely
to stop with wiretapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the government, without
removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled
to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The extensive changes made in the early draft
were characteristic of Brandeis' method of writing opinions.
309. See McKay, supra note 298, at 274 ("In electronic eavesdropping.., the fears of Brandeis
have come alive.").
310. Despite Brandeis' protestation that he had "no general philosophy," A. LiEF, supra note 292,
there is an internal consistency in his positions on important issues that is striking. Brandeis first used
the phrase "A Curse of Bigness" as the title of an article that later became a chapter in his book on the
"money trust." L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, AND How THE BANKERS USE IT (1932). The
collection of Brandeis' writings that contains a reprint of the Warren-Brandeis privacy article was
appropriately entitled "The Curse of Bigness."
311. Interview with J. Willard Hurst, in Madison, Wis. (Oct. 28, 1981); see also M. LERNER, supra
note 285, at 106 ("For there can be no doubt that he [Brandeis] stands thus far defeated. The curse of
bigness, which forms the overwhelming burden of his thinking, is still with us. ").
Among Brandeis' early targets were the "money trust," as personified by the J.P. Morgan interests,
the insurance industry, and the New Haven Railroad (also controlled by J.P. Morgan). See generally A.
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Brandeis was suspicious of all concentrations of power, whether in business or government. Just as he believed that unions were necessary in order
to protect the worker against concentrated economic power,3 12 he also saw
the necessity of protecting the individual from the growing power of
government. 313 Thus the concept of individual rights against the state was a
natural and necessary concept to Brandeis, leading him to use, somewhat
reluctantly,3 14 the Lochner concept of substantive due process as a vehicle
for protecting individual rights against state action. Though he opposed
Lochnerism in its usual context, when it was used to invalidate economic
regulation, he accepted it in the human rights context, where it meant that
"all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by
the federal Constitution from invasion by the states." 315 Such fundamental
rights could be restricted only when restriction was "required in order to
protect the state from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic or moral.",3 16 Thus did Brandeis enunciate what has since evolved
into the strict scrutiny standard applied to legislation restricting fundamental rights: such legislation is constitutional only if necessary ("required")
in order to further a compelling state interest (protecting the state "from

destruction or from serious injury"). It is this "fundamental rights" approach that is under attack in the current debate over judicial review, 317 but

its vulnerability to attack derives from its emphasis on classifying rights
rather than on assessing state interests, an emphasis that owes much to
Lochnerphobia.
Mason, supra note 279.
Diffusion of power was his solution for the curse, in the government as in industry:
For a century our growth has come through national expansion and the increase of the functions of
Federal Government. The growth of the future-at least of the immediate future-must be in
quality and spiritual value. And that can come only through the concentrated, intensified striving
of smaller groups. The field for special effort should now be the State, the city, the village-and
each should be led to seek to excel in something peculiar to it. If ideals are developed locally-the
national ones will come pretty near taking care of themselves.
4 LETERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 497-98 (M. Urofsky & D. Levy eds. 1975).
312. See, e.g., Jaffe, Was Brandeis An Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 986, 992 (1967).
313. Perry has expressed the thought admirably: "The function of human rights is to protect the
individual from the leviathan of the state. As government increases in size and power, government's
capacity to harm individuals-whether deliberately or unthinkingly-increases too, and so the matter
of human rights becomes even more important." M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 164.
314. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("despite
arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive").
315. Id.; see also supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
316. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see Jaffe, supra
note 312, at 992-93.
317. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 55, at 131.
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The Court's adoption of the strict scrutiny standard was a direct result of
its overly zealous rejection of Lochner. Carolene Products and the cases
that followed it 3 18 announced a strong presumption of constitutionality for
legislative judgments, which might have left individual and minority rights

at the mercy of legislative majorities were it not for the caveat expressed in
footnote four, that there might be a "narrower scope for operation of the
presumption of constitutionality" in certain cases. 31 9 Later cases enunciated a standard that, in effect, created a presumption of unconstitutionality

for legislation restricting fundamental rights, which could be rebutted only
by showing that the restriction was necessary to further a compelling state
interest. 320 It is this double standard that has led to the emphasis on
classifying rights in terms of their degree of fundamentalness, opening the

Court to the criticism that it is choosing fundamental values or constructing

32
new rights. '
As it evolved, the double standard gave strict scrutiny to legislation

restricting fundamental individual rights but virtually no scrutiny at all to
economic legislation. Identification and definition of fundamental rights
became the key because the standard of review usually determined the
outcome. This minimized the need for overt balancing of individual rights

against state interests, but it was a departure from Brandeis' vision.
Balancing was an essential ingredient in the Brandeis analysis. He emphasized not only the fundamental nature of the right involved, but also the

322
necessity for its restriction by the state.

Even assuming that the Lochner majority was right in treating liberty of
contract as a fundamental right, Brandeis would still have found economic

regulation constitutional because it was necessary to protect the state from
318. E.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
319. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This was a distinction that
Brandeis had made while Lochner was still in force. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
320. The strict scrutiny standard was first enunciated in an equal protection (racial classification)
case, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which upheld an executive order excluding
persons of Japanese origin from certain areas on the West Coast. Racial classifications, Justice Black
wrote, were "immediately suspect," and therefore subject to "the most rigid scrutiny," and were
justified only by "pressing public necessity." Id. at 216. The term "strict scrutiny" was used two years
earlier in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), together with a reference to marriage and
procreation as being "fundamental," and "one of the basic civil rights of man," id. at 541, but without
enunciating a clearcut standard of review. Justice Douglas said merely that "strict scrutiny" in
sterilization cases "is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made
against groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty ofjust and equal laws."
Id. Nevertheless, he purported to give the state the same "large deference" as had previously been given
in equal protection cases.
321. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 9, at 8, discussed infra notes 389-405 and accompanying text.
322. See Interviews with Paul A. Freund and Henry J. Friendly, supra note 305.
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serious economic injury. 323 Economic liberty or liberty of contract could
well be considered an aspect of the full development of each individual that
Brandeis' concept of democracy required, 324 but economic liberty does not
exist in a vacuum. The marketplace is preeminently characterized by
interaction between individuals and groups, and thus it is inevitable that the
exercise of liberty by one individual is going to "interfere with the exercise
. . . of a like right" by one or more fellow citizens. 325 In practice,
economic liberty turns out to mean liberty for the strong to take advantage
326
of the weak.
Brandeis perceived that the problem with Lochnerism was that the courts
had been "largely deaf and blind" to the economic and social revolution
that had taken place in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 327 He saw
that the courts were "reasoning from abstract conceptions," rather than
from life, 328 and that the courts "lack[ed] understanding of contemporary
industrial conditions. ,329 His remedy was not to displace the courts, or to
restrict their power and discretion, but to fit them to "perform adequately
the functions of harmonizing law with life. "330 Brandeis could see that the
actual effect of striking down regulatory legislation based on the Lochner
323. Recall that under the Whitney test, even fundamental rights are "subject to restriction, if the
particular restriction proposed is requiredin order to protectthe State from destruction or from serious
injury, political, economic or moral." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, L,
concurring) (Emphasis added).
324. See supra note 290 and accompanying text; see also J. CHoPaR, supra note 15, at 84:
Although these rulings benefited persons of property and affluent minorities rather than unpopular
individuals and downtrodden groups and, hence, may be disapproved under contemporary
libertarian standards, the fact is that they served the ideal of limited democracy and secured
interests that were originally regarded as fundamental.
325. J. DEHAAS, supra note 290, at 220.
326. L. BRAN EINS,
TheLiving Law, inTH CURSE OFBIGNESS 319 (1934) (observing that the Social
Darwinist "survival of the fittest" in practice meant "the devil take the hindmost").
327. Id. at 318-19:
Since the adoption of the Federal Constitution, and notably within the last fifty years, we have
passed through an economic and social revolution which affected the life of the people more
fundamentally than any political revolution known to history....
Political as well as economic and social science noted these revolutionary changes. But legal
science-the unwritten or judge-made laws as distinguished from legislation-was largely deaf
and blind to them. Courts continued to ignore newly arisen social needs. They applied complacently eighteenth-century conceptions of the liberty of the individual and of the sacredness of
private property . . . In the course of relatively few years hundreds of statutes which embodied
attempts (often very crude) to adjust legal rights to the demands of social justice were nullified by
the courts, on the grounds that the statutes violated the constitutional guarantees of liberty or
property.
328. Id. at 320; cf Miller, supra note 186, at 674 ("[T]he notion of arms-length bargaining in
nineteenth-century contract law was more fantasy than fact.").
329. L. BRANDEIS, supra note 326, at 323.
330. Id.
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concept of liberty of contract was to "cut down freedom" for one of the
parties. 33' The justification for economic regulation was that intervention
by the state was necessary to ensure that the economic liberty of both
parties was protected. Otherwise the inequality of bargaining power between contracting parties would make liberty of contract a meaningless
abstraction, or worse, an instrument of oppression:
In old times law was meant to protect each citizen from oppression by
physical force. But we have passed to a subtler civilization; from oppression
by force we have come to oppression in other ways. And the law must still
protect a man from the things that rob him of his freedom, whether the
oppressing force be physical or of a subtler kind.
There is no such thing as freedom for a man who under normal conditions is
not financially free. We must therefore find means to create in the individual
financial independence against sickness, accidents, unemployment, old age
and the dread of leaving his family destitute, if he suffer premature death. For
we have become practically a world of employees; and, ifa man is to have real
freedom of contract in dealing with his employer, he must be financially
independentof these ordinarycontingencies.Unless we protect him from this
oppression, it is foolish to call him free. 332

For the majority in the Lochner line of cases, however, liberty of contract
was an abstraction, divorced from the realities of the economic marketplace. In their world, "the employer and the employ6 [had] equality of
right, and any legislation that disturb[ed] that equality [was] an arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract which no government [could]
legally justify in a free land." 333 If inequality of bargaining power existed at
331. Felix Frankfurter's notes of conversations with Brandeis, Brandeis Harvard Papers, supra
note 43, at Box 114, file 14.
In what Professor Freund has described as "one of his most coldly passionate opinions," P. FREUND,
supra note 284, at 138, Brandeis warned the Court that in exercising its "high power" to declare statutes
unconstitutional under substantive due process, "we must ever be on guard, lest we erect our prejudices
into legal principles." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
332. Poole, Foreword to L. BRANDEIS, BUSlNESS-A PROFESSION lii-liii (1914) (quoting Brandeis)
(emphasis added). Brandeis applied the same principle to property rights:
Property must be subject to that control of property which is essential to the enjoyment by every
man of a free individual life. And when property is used to interfere with that fundamental freedom
of life for which property is only a means, then property must be controlled. This applies to the
regulation of trusts and railroads, public utilities and all the big industries that control the
necessities of life. Laws regulating them, far from being infringements on liberty, are in reality
protections against infringements on liberty.
Property is only a means. It has been a frequent error of our courts that they have made the means
an end.
Id. at liii-liv (quoting Brandeis).
333. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (invalidating federal legislation on "yellow
dog" contracts under fifth amendment due process clause).
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all, it was merely the natural order of things, and the law could not take it
into account:
[I]t is said. . to be a matter of common knowledge that "employ6s as a
rule, are not financially able to be as independent in making contracts for the
sale of their labor as are employers in making contracts-of purchase thereof."
No doubt, wherever the rightofprivatepropertyexists, there must and will be
inequalitiesoffortune; and thus it naturallyhappens thatpartiesnegotiating
about a contract are not equally unhamperedby circumstances. This applies

to all contracts, and not merely to that between employer and employ6 ...
[I]t isfrom the nature of things impossible to upholdfreedom of contractand
the right ofprivateproperty without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalitiesoffortune that are the necessaryresultof the exercise

of those rights. But the [due process clause of the fourteenth amendment]
recognizes "liberty" and "property" as co-existent human334
rights, and debars
the States from any unwarranted interference with either.
Brandeis understood the complexities of the economy better than his
colleagues. 335 He dealt with realities, not abstractions; consequently, he
recognized that legislatures were better equipped to deal with the realities
of the marketplace than were the courts. 336 He therefore urged great
deference to legislative judgments in economic matters, even judgments
with which he disagreed. 337 But legislatures could not claim a similar
expertise in dealing with individual human rights; therefore, the same
deference could not be applied to legislation restricting noneconomic
rights. 338 Here, it was courts, rather than legislative majorities, which were
334. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915) (emphasis added) (invalidating a state law
outlawing "yellow dog" contracts). "[A] premise of legal analysis during the Lochnerperiod was the
inviolability of the naturally unequal distribution of ability and fortune among persons." Lupu, supra
note 78, at 987.
Coppage was decided a year before Brandeis joined the Court, but Justice Holmes dissented:
In present conditions a workman not unnaturally may believe that only by belonging to a union can
he secure a contract that shall be fair to him. . . . If that belief, whether right or wrong, may be
held by a reasonable man, it seems to me that it may be enforced by law in orderto establishthe
equality of position between the parties in which liberty of contract begins. . . . [There is
nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it.
Coppage, 236 U.S. at 27 (Holmes, J, dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Brandeis would have
agreed, but unlike Holmes, he also would have had no doubt that the workman's belief was right. See
Jaffe, supra note 312.
335. Among Brandeis' many skills, Walton Hamilton noted one "distinctly his-to contrive to
make terms between the law and the secular subjects upon which it operates." Hamilton, supra note

288, at 1082.
336. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,267 (1918) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
337. See Freund, supra note 299, at 109.
338. Thus Brandeis was willing to apply substantive due process to laws restricting individual
rights in the context of family autonomy in matters of education. E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.

349
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preeminently fitted for the task of protecting the individual from overreaching by the state. 339 So it was that, although Brandeis strongly disapproved
of using substantive due process to strike down economic legislation, he
was nevertheless willing to employ substantive due process to protect the
liberty of parents to control the education of their children. 340 This was not
really a question of the parents' rights being more important, or more
fundamental, than liberty of contract. It was rather that the parents' decision to have their children study a foreign language, 34' or attend a private
school, 342 had a minimal impact on the rights of others. 343 There was
insufficient justification for legislative interference with the parents' decision.
Brandeis' "zeal for privacy" 344 can thus be seen as an effort to protect
those personal decisions so important to the individual's self-development,
which do not implicate legislative power because they do not significantly
interfere with the like rights of others. The need for such protection has
grown over the years. "[A]ll the forces of a technological age" have
operated to "narrow the area of privacy." 345 The constitutional right
enunciated in Griswold is a direct descendent of the substantive due process
rights first protected in Meyer and Pierce; it responds to a need for
protection against invasions of privacy and autonomy far more serious than
the snooping of the press, which led to the original Warren-Brandeis article
on privacy, 346 and far more widespread than wiretapping, which inspired

Brandeis' Olmstead dissent. 347 The same revolution that gave rise to the
need for social and economic legislation to protect "that fundamental
freedom of life for which property is only a means, "348 also created
conditions that threatened individual privacy and autonomy-the core of
390 (1923); see Freund, supra note 299, at 112; Jaffe, supra note 312, at 993.
339. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,471(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The
Whitney concurrence demonstrates that where individual rights (there, first amendment rights) were
concerned, Brandeis was unwilling to accept Ps final the legislature's determination that clear and
present danger existed. However reasonable the legislative judgment that such danger arose from the
activities described in the California criminal syndication statute, the individual was entitled to the
opportunity of demonstrating that no sufficient danger arose from her particular activities.
340. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
341. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
342. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
343. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
345. Emerson, supra note 17, at 229.
346. Unwanted publicity suffered by Brandeis' partner, Samuel Warren, is generally credited as
the inspiration for the Warren-Brandeis article. See, e.g., A. LIEF, BRANDEIS, THE PERSONAL HISTORY
OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 51 (1936); see also I LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 302-03 (M. Urofsky & D.
Levy eds. 1971).
347. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
348. Poole, supra note 332, at liii (quoting Brandeis) (emphasis in original).
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that same fundamental freedom of life. Indeed, the very legislation needed
to protect individual liberty from encroachment by private concentrations
of power inevitably raised a new threat to liberty by contributing to the
growth of government power. 349 Thus there is increasing need to protect the
individual from "the gathering forces of big government. ' 350 And, since
this time the threat comes not from the courts but from the political
branches, the solution must lie with the judicial branch.
The fundamental right of personal privacy and autonomy, rooted as it is
in Brandeis' own conception of protection for the "sacred precincts of
private and domestic life,"' 35 1 is at the very least an appropriate solution.
The attacks upon it reflect the need, forty years after the demise of Lochner,
to articulate a principled basis for distinguishing the right of privacy from
the Lochner brand of substantive due process. It surely is not necessary to
repudiate all of substantive due process, much less the entire mode of
noninterpretive judicial review, in order to make sure that Lochner remains
352
decently buried.
VI.

THE GHOST OF LOCHNER

[A]ll of our recent constitutional history would have been more coherent...
had the Supreme Court never abandoned substantive due process but had
353
merely excised its laissez-faire excrescence.
Liberty under the due process clause has become "an enormous interpretive embarrassment in constitutional law.", 354 The Court's acknowledgment in Roe that the constitutional right of privacy is grounded in due
349. See M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 164 ("As government increases in size and power, government's capacity to harm individuals-whether deliberately or unthinkingly-increases too, and so the
matter of human rights becomes even more important.").
350. McKay, supra note 298, at 279.
351. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 296, at 195.
What is at stake here is nothing less than the basic moral vision of persons as having human
rights: that is, as autonomous and entitled to equal concern and respect. This vision, correctly
invoked by Warren and Brandeis in developing rights to information control, similarly underlies
the constitutional right to privacy.
Richards, supra note 297, at 975. But see Perry, supra note 181, at 440 (advocating abandonment of
"privacy" semantics, as confusing).
352. See Grey, supra note 243, at 711 n.35:
It now seems that the ultimate punchline in the criticism of a constitutional decision is to say that
it is "like Lochner." [citing Ely]. . .Lochneris only one of thousands of decisions in the history
of the Court that invoke a noninterpretive mode of constitutional adjudication; if it was a bad
decision, as I think it was, it by no means follows that the general mode of adjudication it
represents is illegitimate. There are many bad decisions in the mode of pure interpretation.
353. Henkin, supra note 27, at 1427.
354. Gerety, supranote 1, at 159 ("Why not, then, a theory of liberty? For a thousand reasons, all
of which come to one: Lochner.").
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process liberty 355 raises the fear of a return to the unbridled judicial
discretion that characterized the Lochner era. Forty years of repeated
rejection of Lochner 356 have left a climate that is inhospitable to any form of
substantive due process.
Yet, despite frequent interment, substantive due process never really
died. It was the means by which first amendment guarantees were first
protected against encroachment by state action, 357 a protection that continued unabated throughout the time when the Court was periodically
burying Lochner. Moreover, such substantive protection has not been
confined to rights explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights. The right to
travel abroad was accorded protection from federal action as part of the
"liberty" safeguarded under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 358 The problem is not that substantive due process still lives, but that
its continued life has not been adequately acknowledged or justified.
In principle at least, substantive due process has "respectable claims in
359
the philosophy of government which was our original inheritance. ,
Lochner was a misapplication of the principle, 360 so its repudiation
certainly did not require total rejection of substantive due process. But that
355. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
356. E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941). The rejection of
Lochner may have begun even earlier with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See G. GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 533-34.
357. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927): Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Of course, the true interpretivist will object even to this use of substantive due process. See R. BERGER,
supra note 9, at 270-74.
358. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)
(statutory interpretation to "avoid" constitutional issue).
359. Henkin, supra note 27, at 1412.
Ours is an Eighteenth Century Constitution, reflecting Enlightened views of popular sovereignty.
and of government limited in powers and purposes. The Constitution does not confer private rights
....
The Constitution does not even command that government grant, promote or extend private
rights; it only places limits on the infringement of private rights by government, both the rights
specified and all others "retained by the people."
Reflecting contemporary philosophy, out of Locke (filtered through Blackstone) with some
Rousseau, the Constitution blended several related elements-the original equality and independence of the individual, the sovereignty of the people. . . ,limited government by consent of the
governed for purposes determined by them, and rights retained under government.
Id. Professor Henkin found these elements reflected in the Preamble to the Constitution, the ninth
amendment, and the Declaration of Independence (Ely's "brief"). Id.
360. L. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 11-2, at 566. According to Tribe, the error of Lochner "was not in
invoking a value the Constitution did not mark as special; the text evinces most explicit concern with
'liberty,' 'contract,' and property. The error lay in giving that value a perverse content." Id.; see also
Ely, supra note 229, at 15 ("[Bly and large it is the particular values the Court chose to protect-notably
'liberty of contract'-and not the general methodology of identifying fundamental values and enforcing them on the political branches, that has come in for criticism."); Lupu, supra note 78, at 989 (The
survival of Meyer and Pierce "suggests that the only durable objection to the Lochner era's handiwork is
that it generally selected the 'wrong' values for protection.").

352
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is the form repudiation took, and still takes. From Black to Ely, those who
attack substantive due process do so out of fear that the Court will repeat the
errors of the Lochner era, that it will again identify the "wrong" liberty and
so frustrate the will of the majority. To avoid this danger, they would extract
all substantive content from the word "liberty," but clearly this exalts
majoritarianism far above the value placed upon it by the framers, who
showed a healthy skepticism for the tyranny of majorities when they built
into the constitutional scheme a number of restraints designed to curb

majority rule. 361 The cure for Lochnerism is not Lochnerphobia. What is
needed is a frank acknowledgment of the continuing vitality of substantive
due process, coupled with a conscientious effort to enunciate a sound
362
constitutional rationale for the substantive due process right of privacy.
Safeguarding the right of individuals to conduct their private lives
without unnecessary interference from the state poses none of the hazards
of Lochner. When the Court invalidated economic legislation, it disabled
the people's elected representatives from dealing with economic problems,
overruling the decision of the majority that certain areas of public life
required regulation by government. Invalidation of a regulation simply
created a power vacuum that was quickly filled by private power. 363 When
the Court acts to protect an individual's private life from government
361. Ely concedes as much. See J. ELY, supra note 6, at 7-9. What he does not concede is the power
of "politically unaccountable judges [to] select and define the values to be placed beyond majority
control." Id. at 8. The answer to Ely is that those values have already been selected and placed beyond
majority control by the Constitution itself. The Court's task is to identify the values and apply them in
disparate social contexts-thus perhaps "defining" them, but in a much more limited sense than Ely
envisions.
The Constitution itself is the element that is "most embarrassing" to the view that "majority will is
the guiding principle of our political affairs." Sager, Rights Skepticism andProcess-BasedResponses,
56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 417, 443 (1981).
362. The Court's failure to enunciate a sound constitutional rationale is the strongest ground for
criticism of Roe. See, e.g., A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT INAMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113
(1976):
My criticism ofRoe v. Wade is that the Court failed to establish the legitimacy of the decision by
not articulating a precept of sufficient abstractness to lift the ruling above the level of a political
judgment based upon the evidence currently available from the medical, physical, and social
sciences.
Unlike Ely, Professor Cox is not troubled by the Court's use of the due process clause as the source of
the right. Id. ("I find sufficient connection in the Due Process Clause."); see also Morgan, supra note
168, at 1724 ("Rarely does the Supreme Court invite critical outrage as it did in Roe by offering so little
explanation for a decision that requires so much.").
363. For an interesting discussion of the "continuity" between public power and private power in
the Lochner era, see Nerken, A New Deal for The Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights:
Challenging the DoctrinalBases of the Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 297, 339-47 (1977); see also G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95-96 (1974) ("[A]
system in which everybody is invited to do his own thing, at whatever cost to his neighbor, must work
ultimately to the benefit of the rich and powerful."), quoted in Nerken, supra, at 332 n. 105; cf. L.
BRANDEIS, supra note 326.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 61:293, 1986

interference, however, the majoritarian processes are not impeded in any
significant way, because the public need for this kind of regulation is much
less urgent. 364 The Court is merely fulfilling its historic constitutional role

of protecting the individual from the state. All that is at stake here is the
power of the majority to impose its will on the individual in matters that are
of little real concern to the state, but usually of great concern to the
individual. In CaroleneProductsfootnote four terms, it is the state against
the smallest of all minorities, the minority of one. 365 Surely this, too, is an

area in which the political processes cannot be relied upon to protect the
rights of the minority in question.

Of all the areas of protected privacy identified by the Court, the abortion
decision may be the least susceptible to regulation by the political pro-

cesses. For a hundred years, the legislative response to this agonizing
human dilemma was the simplistic one of near-total prohibition. Political

pressure for reform yielded limited results in the late sixties, leading to the
less restrictive laws exemplified by the Georgia statute invalidated in Doe v.
Bolton. 366 The intense political pressure that developed in opposition to
abortion reform made it unlikely that even this limited reform could be

364. See generally J. CHOPER, supra note 15; Perry, supra note 130. This is not a question of
economic rights being less important than "personal" rights, as is sometimes argued, but a question of
how necessary regulation by the state has become. There may have been a time when economic life was
simple enough, and personal enough, so that economic freedom could realistically be considered a
basic freedom. Today, however desirable such freedom might be, it is unrealistic to suppose that it is
attainable in our present complex economy. On the other hand, our complex society and technological
advances have greatly increased the opportunity for intrusion by both government and individuals into
private lives, so the need for constitutional protection in this area is greatly increased.
The Griswold-Eisenstadt limitation on the police power of the states is intelligible (as Justice
Stewart's concurrence in Roe suggests) only as a declaration that conception (for most purposes at
least) does not implicate the public welfare. The most forthright and cogent explanation of the
Griswold-Eisenstadt result is that legislation restricting contraception is constitutionally ultra
vires because it intrudes on a personal matter not involving, and hence beyond, the public welfare.
The power to police the public welfare may not extend to "rights which are purely and exclusively
private."
Perry, supra note 130, at 705 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876)).
365. Cf Ackerman, supra note 55, at 722.
366. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Beginning with Colorado in 1967, about one fourth of the states had
adopted such legislation, patterned on section 230.3 of The American Law Institute's MODEL PENAL
CODE. Id. at 182. The Georgia statute permitted abortion when the physician considered it medically
necessary because:
(I)A continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the life of the pregnant woman or would
seriously and permanently injure her health; or
(2)The fetus would very likely be born with a grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or
physical defect; or
(3)The pregnancy resulted from forcible or statutory rape.
Id. at 183.
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adopted everywhere.3 67 This, together with the restrictions embodied in the
new abortion legislation, made the availability of abortion increasingly
turn on the financial resources of the pregnant woman. 368 The emotional
nature of the issue and its entanglement with questions of moral judgment
and religious doctrine made it ill-suited for political solution. 369 If this
situation did not compel the Court to intervene on behalf of the pregnant
woman's freedom of choice, it at least provided adequate justification for
370
the intervention, even in footnote four terms.
The criticism of Roe has largely ignored, or has trivialized, the pregnant
woman's need for protection against the majoritarian process. It has focused instead on the Court's failure to deal adequately with the conflicting
rights of the unborn child. 371 But to state the problem as involving "two
liberty interests rather than one" 372 is to assume away the very question at
issue: whether the fetus is a "person" entitled to protection not only of its
liberty, but also of its life, under the fourteenth amendment. 373 However
367. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at 929-30; Vinovskis, Abortion and the Presidential
Election of 1976: A MultivariateAnalysis of Voting Behavior, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1750, 1752 (1979).
Public opinion polls showed a leveling off of support for the pro-choice position, roughly corresponding
with the increase in vocal opposition to the abortion decisions. See Uslander & Weber, supra note 157.
368. A woman's ability to secure an abortion would often depend on her ability to travel to another
state, or to secure the services of one or more physicians to attest to her need for the procedure.
369. Cf Bennett, supra note 158, at 993-1008.
The restrictions on abortion retained in The Model Penal Code were largely designed to forestall
anticipated religious opposition. See Schwartz, supra note 159, at 683-86.
370. Ely avoids recognizing abortion as a question of the individual's rights against the state by
casting it in terms of a right of women as a group; he then contrasts the political representation of women
with that of fetuses. Ely, supra note 3, at 933-34 ("Compared with men, very few women sit in our
legislatures, a fact I believe should bear some relevance. . . to the appropriate standard of review for
legislation that favors men over women. But no fetuses sit in our legislatures."). The fact that few
women sit in our legislatures may or may not have some bearing on the kind of abortion legislation so far
produced. But privacy is an individual right, not a group right. The abortion decision is a private,
individual decision, and the question is who will make the decision, the woman or the state. An allfemale legislature would have no greater right to impose its decision on the individual woman than
would any other legislature. The fact that no fetuses sit in the legislature seems to have had little effect
on the degree of legislative protection accorded to fetal rights, as witness the proliferation of legislation
forbidding the funding of abortions at both state and federal levels. Cf.Bennett, supra note 158, at
995-96 n.71.
Even if it were accurate to speak of privacy as a group right, it is doubtful that the relevant group in the
abortion context would be all women. It may be more accurate to view women seeking abortions as a
sub-class, and one with which the larger class of women has some difficulty identifying. See Cox, Book
Review, 94 HARv. L. REv. 700, 710-11 (1981) (reviewing L ELY,DEMOcRACY AND DiSTRusT (1980)).
"Are not women who seek abortion at least 'fallen women' according to 'outmoded stereotypes,' so that
we must suspect that an outmoded stereotype may have unduly influenced the legislature?" Cox, supra,
at 710.
371. See Gibbons, supra note 206, at 273; Ely, supra note 3, at 923-26.
372. Gibbons, supra note 206, at 273.
373. Justice Blackmun's opinion attempts to answer this question by an extended discussion of
historical data reflecting legal, medical, philosophical, and social attitudes toward the rights of the
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complex and intractable the philosophical and religious issues raised by
this question may be, the Supreme Court clearly reached a defensible
conclusion on the legal issue. The states' arguments for fetal personhood
were not supported by the very abortion laws they defended. Even the
restrictive Texas statute involved in Roe implicitly treated the fetus as less
than a full-fledged person; it permitted abortion "for the purpose of saving
the life of the mother." 374 When the rights of the mother and fetus came into
direct conflict, the mother's right was given greater weight. Moreover, the
Texas statute, like many other such statutes, was directed toward the person
performing or procuring the abortion rather than the pregnant woman
herself. 375 The penalty was two to five years in the penitentiary, hardly a
fitting penalty for intentionally taking the life of a person.
The fact that the law has never treated the fetus as a person does not
mean, however, that the state has no interest in protecting it. The due
process question actually posed in Roe was whether the mother's right to
privacy outweighed the state's interest in protecting the fetus' right to
potential life. This question the Court answered only in conclusory terms:
the state's interest in protecting fetal life becomes compelling at the point
where the fetus is capable of surviving outside the womb. At that point, the
fetus' right to begin its life outweighs all but the mother's right to continue
hers. 376 This is certainly a rational solution to a problem so complex as to be
virtually insoluable, but the Court's conclusion was not so self-evident as to
require no elaboration.
No amount of justification could possibly suffice to persuade anyone
who is convinced, as a matter of religious or moral belief, that a fullfledged human being comes into existence at the moment of conception.
Once this basic premise is assumed and is no longer open to rational debate,
all other conclusions flow inevitably from it. From this point of view, Roe is
clearly wrong, and it would be just as wrong if it had been decided by a
legislature rather than a court. 377 But the arguments that characterize Roe as
unborn. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-52; see also id. at 156-59.
If the fetus were found to be a person entitled to fourteenth amendment protection, the argument
could be made that equal protection requires the state to extend to fetuses the protection of laws against
homicide and child abuse, under a burden on fundamental rights (here, right to life) analysis. See supra
note 125.
374. Roe, 410 U.S. at 118.
375. Id. at 117.
376. Id. at 164-65 (after viability, the state may prohibit abortion, except where necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother).
377. See Glover, supra note 160.
It is this point of view that logically supports the charge that the Supreme Court in Roe was merely
substituting its answer to the question of "when life begins" for that of the legislature. When an
individual believes that she knows to a moral certainty what the "right" answer is-and the legislature
has supported that choice-the Court, in overturning the legislative choice, is simply substituting its
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Lochnerism proceed from different premises. These arguments may even
concede, as Ely does, that the Court's disposition would have been entirely
acceptable if it had come from a legislature rather than a court. This is the
kind of criticism that might have been defused by a more careful discussion
of the rights and interests involved in regulation of abortion, particularly, as
Brandeis teaches, the interests asserted by the state. Such a discussion
would at least have clarified some of the distinctions between Roe and
Lochner.
For one thing, the Court might have placed more emphasis on the first
amendment implications of the pregnant woman's right to choose whether
to become a parent. When the state denies her the right to make this choice,
so crucial to her personal life, when it seeks to force upon her the moral and
religious views of others, this at least raises a question whether her rights of
conscience and belief, including her right to the free exercise of her
religious beliefs, have not been violated. Her first amendment rights, as
well as her equal protection rights and her rights of privacy and autonomy
under the fourteenth amendment, are of sufficient weight to impose upon
the state a duty to justify the denial by a showing of compelling interest.
The primary interest argued by the state in Roe, and cited by most of its
critics, is the interest in preserving the life of the fetus. Roe concedes the
importance of this interest; once the fetus achieves viability, the state's
interest in preserving its life outweighs the mother's rights so as to justify
regulation or prohibition of abortion, unless the mother's life or health is
endangered. In order to justify drawing the line at viability, the Court
needed to be more explicit in its conceptualization of fetal rights as growing
over time. The most relevant legal precedent, Griswold, had already
established the individual's right to decide whether to use contraceptives,
and some forms of contraceptives operate after conception. It would seem,
therefore, that the state's position that its interest in fetal life was compelling from the moment of conception was already all but foreclosed by
Griswold. Unless the Court was prepared to retreat from Griswold, the
problem was to identify some event after conception of sufficient significance to boost the state's interest to the compelling point. 378 Three possibilities were identified by the Court: quickening, viability, and live birth.
own answer-the "wrong" answer-for that of the legislature. No person so convinced of the rightness
of her answer could ever accept the notion that what the Supreme Court really said was that no
government entity, court or legislature, is entitled to answer that basic moral question for the individual
most closely involved. Nor could such a person accept the idea that Roe would protect her choice-the
"right" choice-as readily as it now protects the choice to have an abortion. (But, of course, if it were
his "right" answer, the only way to protect it would be by legislation, which may be a significant part of
the problem.)
378. But see King, supra note 131, at 1673-74 (suggesting that conception is not an event, but
"occurs over an extended time period").
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The historical roots of abortion legislation suggested quickening; 379 the law
in other areas pointed to live birth as the decisive event. 380 The Court's
choice of the intermediate point, viability, recognized both the need to
bring abortion laws into closer harmony with other law and the fact that
abortion is a far more serious invasion of fetal rights than, say, denial of a
right to sue in tort.
There are also, concededly, policy reasons for placing the dividing line at
viability. Placing it at quickening would have foreclosed abortion in many
cases of severe fetal abnormalities that are undetectable in early pregnancy.
Drawing the line at live birth would have intolerably blurred the distinction
between feticide and infanticide and would have created agonizing problems of proof. It would be absurd to argue that these and other questions of
policy had nothing to do with the Court's choice of viability as the
touchstone. The point is that the Court does not exceed its proper sphere
unless and until questions of policy are the only criteria used in reaching a
decision. So long as the decision can be justified in terms of constitutional
values and traditional methods of rational judicial decisionmaking, it
should not be dismissed as judicial legislation, or Lochnerism. Rather, the
fact that a decision finds support in policy as well as in rational constitutional analysis should count as a point in its favor.
One might still argue, as Brandeis may well have argued, that the Court
should have stayed out of the controversy as a matter of judicial selfrestraint. 381 But Brandeis' self-restraint would not have been motivated by
the fear of charges of Lochnerism. Anyone with his finely developed ability
to analyze and distinguish complex fact situations would not have equated
the personal changes caused by pregnancy with the changes wrought by the
industrial revolution, which had brought about the legislation invalidated in
Lochner. Industrialization brought widespread restructuring of our social
and economic life, which obviously affected many lives. Legislative responses to the industrial revolution represented an attempt to protect
individuals against the new dangers that resulted from those social and
economic changes. A considerable quantity of data was available to legislatures to aid them in arriving at decisions of policy to be embodied in
regulatory legislation. These were the kinds of policy decisions legislatures
are particularly well-qualified to make and enforce. 382 When the Supreme
379. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 132-34.
380. See id. at 161-62 (discussing tort law and inheritance law).
381. Alternatively, considerations of judicial restraint might find Roe itself justifiable because of
the severity of the Texas statute involved, but draw the line at the less sweeping statute invalidated in
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), and latercases. See Ginsburg, supra note 173, at 381-82; Freund,
Storms Over The Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1474, 1480 (1983); cf. Bennett, supranote 158, at 1008.
382. The appropriateness of certain kinds of issues for legislative determination was a key element
in Brandeis' doctrine of judicial restraint. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
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Court threw out those legislative policy decisions, it did so, not on the basis
of conflicting data, but on the basis of an abstract construct of its own,
embodying philosophical views never openly acknowledged.
With abortion legislation, the situation is significantly different. It is the
legislative judgments themselves that embody philosophical (and religious) views in an area where there are "fundamentally conflicting views
383 Such legislative judgments are not based on economic
of morality. ,,
or
social data and do not protect society against any concrete danger. No stock
market will crash, no millions will face unemployment if the legislature
fails to act. Abortion laws attempt to solve, not so much a social problem,
as an individual problem of great complexity and great import to the
individual involved. In this context, the intractable nature of the problem
leads to the conclusion, not that it should be left to the legislatures, but that
it should be left to the individual. Whatever the decision may be, it is the
individual who is going to have to deal with its consequences, not the state.
When the consequences are so grave and far reaching, only the person who
must bear them should be entitled to make the choice. 384 It is the nature of
the state's interests, 3 85 as well as the fundamentalness of the individual
U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting):
Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should precede a determination of the
limitations which should be set upon any property right in news or of the circumstances under
which news gathered by a private agency should be deemed affected with a public interest. Courts
would be powerless to prescribe the detailed regulations essential to full enjoyment of the rights
conferred or to introduce the machinery required for enforcement of such regulations. Considerations such as these should lead us to decline to establish a new rule of law in the effort to redress a
newly-disclosed wrong, although the propriety of some remedy appears to be clear.
383.
In present day, heterogeneous, secular American society, the law of abortion operates
in an area of fundamentally conflicting views of morality. Here is no question of imposing
conformity to community consensus on a few heretics or visionaries, but of employing the
machinery of the state to coerce some major groups in the population to conform to the ideals of
others. It is not a question of restricting the freedom of a few eccentrics to avoid inflicting great
psychic injury on the bulk of the population, but of restricting the freedom of scores of millions of
citizens, having conflicting but equally respectable sensibilities, to be protected.
Schwartz, supra note 159, at 683.
384. See Tribe, supra note 150, at 40:
A woman in contemporary America who is coerced into submitting herself, at the insistence of a
man empowered by law to control her choice, to the pains and anxieties of carrying, delivering,
and nurturing a child she did not wish to conceive or does not want to bear and raise, is entitled to
believe that more than a play on words has come to link her forced labor with the concept of
involuntary servitude.
Under restrictive abortion laws, women are "being used in a way no one else. . . in our society is
ever used. . . . [T]heir bodies are being taken over by the state for the benefit of third persons ... "
Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1630-31 (1979) (constructing a rationale for
Roe based on the "law of samaritanism"). It is an added irony that abortion laws are of limited
effectiveness in protecting fetal life, as witness the prevalence ofillegal abortion in the pre-Roe period.
385. What distinguishes morals legislation (including abortion legislation) from other penal laws
is the "absence of ordinary justification for punishment by a non-theocratic state. The ordinary
justification for secular penal controls is preservation of public order." Schwartz, supra note 159, at
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interests involved, that distinguishes Roe from Lochner, and the Court's
failure to address this important distinction can be traced to
Lochnerphobia.
One of the more insidious outgrowths of Lochnerphobia has been the
aversion it has engendered to the balancing of interests. Justice Black's
suspicion of balancing 386 was an aspect of the same distrust of judicial
discretion that animated his abhorrence of Lochner's "natural law due
process philosophy. 387 The result has not been to do away with balancing-indeed, judicial decisionmaking would hardly be possible without
it388-but to drive it underground. Identification of a right as "fundamental" has become the key inquiry-the mechanical process of definition has
replaced the art of balancing. So we find the Court in Griswold and Roe
more concerned with the fundamentalness of the right of privacy than with
the absence of sufficient justification for state interference with the right.
This has made it easy to cast the debate over judicial review, as Bork does,
in terms of the court's choice of "fundamental values" 389 or the construction of "new rights." 390 This formulation leads inexorably to the conclusion that noninterpretive review is nothing more than "constitutional
policymaking. "391
Bork's formulation, along with his insistence on confining the Court to
value-neutral principles, 392 enables him to equate the facts of Griswold
669.
386. This is apparent in the first amendment cases. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 336 U.S. 36.
56 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (attacking "the doctrine that permits constitutionally protected rights to
be 'balanced' away whenever a majority of this Court thinks that a state might have interest sufficient to
justify abridgement of those freedoms"). In the flag-burning case, Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969), Justice Black's dissent attacked the balancing approach employed by Justice Harlan's majority
opinion, though Justice Black would have sustained the conviction because he considered flag burning
to be "conduct" rather than speech.
387. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). For discussion of
the absolutes-versus-balancing controversy, see, e.g., Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on
The First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REv. 428 (1967) (finding the controversy "on the whole to have
been an unfortunate, misleading, and unnecessary one").
388. Balancing is "the essence of the judicial process-the nexus between abstract law and
concrete life. . . . Surely the choice is simply this: shall the balancing be done 'intuitively' or
rationally; covertly or out in the open?" Mendelson, The FirstAmendment and the JudicialProcess:A
Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REv. 479, 481-82 (1964); see also M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 232 (1984) (discussing balancing in the context of first amendment
overbreadth analysis) ("By denying the existence of interest-balancing ... the Court was not avoiding
use of a balancing process; rather, it was turning the process into an unstated, and therefore likely
unthinking and less refined, balance.")
389. Bork, supra note 9, at 8 ("[Tlhe choice of 'fundamental values' by the Court cannot be
justified."); see also J. Ely, supra note 6, at 43-72.
390. Bork, supra note 9, at 8 ("The judge must stick close to the [constitutional] text and history.
and their fair implications, and not construct new rights.").
391. M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 6.
392. Bork, supra note 9, at 7.
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with "a hypothetical suit by an electric utility company and one of its
customers to void a smoke pollution ordinance as unconstitutional. ,393 His
analysis then can be reduced to a comparison between "forms of gratification"-sexual gratification versus economic gratification 394-leading to
his conclusion that no court can make a valid distinction between the two:
"There is no principled way to decide that one man's gratifications are more
deserving of respect than another's or that one form of gratification is more
worthy than another. '395 Thus the only principled course is "to let the
majority have its way in both cases. "396
Bork's analysis is as incomplete as Douglas' in Griswoldor Blackmun's
in Roe. Bork never considers the differences between the government's
interest in regulating smoke pollution and its interest in prohibiting the use
of contraceptives. Even a passing glance at the public need for these two
forms of regulation would reveal that the societal impact of smoke pollution
is vastly greater than that of contraceptive use by married couples, but
Bork's comparison of gratifications does not even include the "gratifications" asserted by the state, an essential ingredient in the constitutional
balance. 397 Only the interests asserted againstthe state are weighed against
each other, in the abstract, divorced from their social and legal contexts, so
398
that Bork can easily find them indistinguishable.
In the context of a decision regarding the constitutionality of a statute
restricting individual liberty-and Bork concedes "there are some areas of

393. Id. at 9. Bork considers these two cases "identical." Id.
394. Id. at 10.
395. Id.
The necessary implication of [Bork and Rehnquist's] moral skepticism is that there is no
"principled" ground on which the Court or indeed anyone else can oppose duly enacted laws
establishing segregation or abolishing freedom of expression or of religion. The value judgment
that segregation is morally evil, or that freedom of expression or of religion is morally good, has no
claim on us as a society (except and only to the extent that such judgments have been enacted into
positive law). Indeed, according to moral skepticism, there is no "principled"-morally nonarbitrary-ground for objecting to laws authorizing torture, establishing slavery, or even instituting
another Holocaust. . . .[The point is that] moral skepticism is a terribly difficult position to take
seriously in this post-Holocaustal age. Moreover, it is, happily, a position not widely shared in the
United States today, nor has it ever been.
M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 105 (footnotes omitted).
396. Bork, supra note 9, at 10.
397. Bork does identify the state interests that could be asserted. For pollution control, the "State
can assert not only that the majority prefer clean air to lower prices, but also that the absence of the
regulation impairs the majority's physical and aesthetic gratifications." Id. He might have added a
concern for health. For the prohibition of contraceptives, the "state can assert, and at one stage in that
litigation did assert, that the majority finds the use of contraceptives immoral. Knowledge that it takes
place and that the State makes no effort to inhibit it causes the majority anguish, impairs their
gratifications." Id. at 9-10.
398. "No answer is what the wrong question begets." A. BIcKEL, supra note 11, at 103.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 61:293, 1986

life a majority should not control" 399-the state's reason for the restriction
is a crucial element. In prohibiting the deprivation of liberty without due
process of law,
the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. . . .[T]he liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which
requires the protection of law against the evils which menace the health,
safety, morals, and welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is
thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which
is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the
400
community is due process.
In the context of Griswold, it is the mere knowledge that someone out there
is using contraceptives that constitutes the "evil." ' 40 1 Unless one can
rationally conclude that such knowledge menaces the "morals ... of the
people," there is no sufficient justification for prohibiting use of contraceptives. Whether smoke pollution is an evil menacing the "health,
safety . . . and welfare of the people" is, at the very least, a much closer
question. 402 The distinction between the two cases lies, not solely in the

fundamentalness of the values protected, but also in the seriousness of the
evils addressed and the necessity for protecting society against them.
Even if one looks only at the values protected, there is much more
involved here than Bork's "sexual gratification." Personal privacy and
autonomy are more than the purely personal value choices of a wayward

Court. They are an integral part of our constitutional design. 40 3 It is the
critics of the constitutional right to privacy, not the Court, who have "lost
touch with the moral vision underlying the constitutional design.' 404 The
formulation of the right of privacy may have begun with values derived by
Warren and Brandeis from the common law, but with his Olinsteaddissent,
399. Bork, supra note 9, at 3.
400. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
401. In a different context, Justice Rehnquist described the same kind of evil as "the psychological
consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees." Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982).
Justice Rehnquist did not consider such an injury sufficient to confer standing, even when the conduct
was actually observed (as using contraceptives is not) and was also alleged to be a violation of the
religion clauses of the first amendment. Id.
402. And so, concededly, is abortion. Although, as with contraception, it is the mere knowledge
that the activity is taking place that constitutes the "menace," the societal interest in preserving prenatal
life adds considerable weight to the state's interest. The burden on the pregnant woman's liberty,
however, is also much weightier.
403. See L. TRIBE, supra note 16, at § 15-3. "[T]he Constitution is not a totalitarian design,
depending for its success upon the homogenization or depersonalization of humanity. The judiciary has
thus reached into the Constitution's spirit and texture, and has elaborated from the spare text an idea of
the 'human' and a concept of 'being' not merely contemplated but required." Id. at 893.
404. Richards, supra note 297, at 1017.
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Brandeis found the connection between these common law values and
similar values embedded in our Constitution and Bill of Rights. The
original conception of a government of limited powers and rights retained
by the people itself embodies Brandeis' concept of "inviolate personality." 405 The constitutional connection was further elaborated in Harlan's
Poe dissent, and even in Douglas' penumbra opinion in Griswold. This
process did not import values into the Constitution; it merely identified
values that were already there.
The very abstractness of Bork's argument is oddly reminiscent of
Lochner, indicating that his reasoning is infected with the same flaw that
Brandeis identified in Lochner-reasoning from abstract conceptions
rather than from life. 4 06 And since Bork's premises are accepted, at least
arguendo, by the present proponents of majoritarianism, the same flaw
permeates the debate on judicial review, giving rise to a new majoritarian
difficulty. Some erstwhile noninterpretivists have conceded all to the strict
interpretivists, allowing them to define the limits of judicial review, so that
any review beyond the narrow limits of clause-bound interpretivism must
be justified or conceded to be a raw assertion of political power. 40 7 Ely
attempts a justification in terms of CaroleneProducts footnote four, and
Perry in terms of prophecy, but such justifications are neither sufficient nor
necessary. What is missing in the current discourse is any sense of the
purpose of our constitutional scheme.408 It is the old confusion of ends with
means. Revolutions are not fought to secure majority rule, but for the
promise of a better life that the democratic process holds out. Perhaps the
two hundred years that have elapsed since our Revolution have dimmed the
memory and obscured the values for which it was fought, and perhaps that
405. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 296, at 205.
406. L. BRANDEIS, supra note 326, at 320.
407. See supra notes 190-99 and accompanying text. "We have seen an extraordinary amount of
talent deployed to reconcile judicial review and democracy." Dworkin, supra note 230, at 516.
Another commentator suggests that Perry "allows the challenge of skepticism to take hold, and
attempts to defeat it on a battlegroundit has chosen." O'Fallon, Skepticism andPoliticsin the Domain
of Rights, 8 DAYTON L. REv. 713, 715 (1983) (emphasis added).
Sedler concludes that "the purported tension between representative democracy and noninterpretive
review is illusory. As a result, the underlying assumption of the legitimacy debate is completely
erroneous, and the framework within which the debate has proceeded is analytically unsound. Thus, the
validity of the debate itself is most dubious." Sedler, supra note 16, at 97.
408. See Dworkin, supra note 230, at 472-73; cf. M. REDISH, supra note 388, at 19:
The primary flaw in the [first amendment] analysis of Bork and Meiklejohn is that they never
attempt to ascertain what basic value or values the democratic process was designed to
serve. . . .[Plolitical democracy is merely a means to-or, in another sense, a logical outgrowth
of-the much broader value of individual self-realization. The mistake of Bork and Meiklejohn,
then, is that they have confused one means of obtaining the ultimate value with the value itself.
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is why the vision of the immigrant, or of a first generation American like
Brandeis, is sometimes much clearer.
The significance of rights of privacy and autonomy in the modern world
should not be lost in the endless debates on abortion and judicial review.

Privacy is more than just a vague concept; it is "the necessary, limiting
condition of much or all that we value in our intimate lives."

40 9

Conse-

quently, it is a right that "has flourished as a result of this nation's
dedication to individual rights and the related concept of human dignity."' 410 To see this right through the eyes of Brandeis is to see a fusion of
the original revolutionary concept with the reality of its application to the

complex facts of living in the present day. 4 11 This is a concept that no more
threatens our form of constitutional democracy than does the Bill of Rights,
4 12
which restricts the majority's power to curb individual rights.
Judicial review "insures that the most fundamental issues of public
morality will finally be set out and debated as issues of principle and not
simply issues of political power." 413 Its "irreplaceable value ...
lies in
the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of
individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action." 4 14 If we abandon that practice now, in favor of a

sterile jurisprudence based on pure majoritarianism, then we must say to
Brandeis that we no longer value liberty as an end, but only as a means; that
the final end of the state is not to make men and women free to develop their
409. Gerety, supra note 297, at 245.
410. Peck, supra note 17, at 898; see also Glennon, supra note 230, at 232-33 (arguing that the
Griswold right of personal autonomy-Brandeis' "right to be let alone"-"might properly be regarded
as fundamental-perhaps, indeed, the most fundamental of rights").
411. Recall Professor Freund's assessment that "with immense resourcefulness he found ways to
build the ancient ideals we profess into the structure of twentieth-century America." P. FREUND, supra
note 284, at 145; see also Dworkin, supra note 230, at 469: "We seem caught in a dilemma defined by
the contradiction between democracy and ancient, fundamental, and uncertain law, each of which is
central to our sense of our traditions .... "
412. Cf Bennett, supra note 158, at 987 ("[D]istrust of majoritarian rule is a major theme of our
political heritage," formally embodied in the Constitution itself).
413. Dworkin, supra note 230, at 517; cf M. PERRY, supra note 1, at 101 ("[The practice of
noninterpretive review has evolved as a way of remedying what would otherwise be a serious defect in
American Government-the absence of any policymaking institution that regularly deals with fundamental political-moral problems other than by mechanical reference to established moral conventions.").
414. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
In discussing Learned Hand's skepticism, Richards notes that
Hand concedes strong substantive moral values of human rights were assumed by the great
founding documents-the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights. But,
following Holmes, he argues that a sound jurisprudence (legal positivism) requires that law be
cynically washed in acid to remove all such moral ideals. When we do so, given the substantive
dependence of judicial review on such values, judicial review is left without content.
Richards, supra note 230, at 729 (footnotes omitted).
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faculties, but only to make government more majoritarian; and that
whether or not liberty is the secret of happiness is the kind of moral
judgment that should be left to the majoritarian political processes. 4 15 This
is too high a price to pay for a doomed attempt to limit the discretion of
judges.

415. The paraphrase, of course, is of the Brandeis concurrence in Whitney v. CaItfornia:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to
develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the
arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret
of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. . ..
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927). The remainder of the quotation deals with liberty as a means, specifically,
"freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think [as] means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth." Id. This justification for protection of first amendment rights fits into Ely's
process-oriented approach, and represents, in fact, his preferred justification (that these rights are
"critical to the functioning of an open and effective democratic process"). J. ELY, supranote 6, at 105.
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